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Eldar and Rauterberg:

Is Corporate Law Nonpartisan?
Ofer Eldar and Gabriel Rauterberg*
ABSTRACT. Only rarely does the United States Supreme Court hear a case with fundamental
implications for corporate law. In Carney v. Adams, however, the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to address whether the State of Delaware’s requirement of partisan balance for its
judiciary violates the First Amendment. Although the Court disposed of the case on other grounds,
Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that the issue “will likely be raised again.” The stakes are high
because most large businesses are incorporated in Delaware and thus are governed by its corporate
law. Former Governors and Chief Justices of Delaware lined up to defend the state’s “nonpartisan”
approach to its judiciary. The case raises the question of why nonpartisanship is taken to be an
advantage for Delaware and whether the processes by which corporate law is made are generally
politically partisan or not. Despite these developments, however, the place of political partisanship
in corporate law has been largely overlooked.
This Article offers a framework for analyzing the role of political partisanship in corporate
law. It begins by showing that there is suggestive evidence of a relationship between political
partisanship and the substance of corporate law at the state level. When corporate law materially
differs across states, those differences are often predicted by which party controls the state’s
government. Political party entrepreneurs also agitate for corporate law reforms at the state level.
Yet, Delaware adopts a conspicuously nonpartisan approach to corporate law. As is widely
observed, how Delaware makes corporate law, from its constitution, to its legislature, to its judiciary,
is unusual. It is designed to insulate that law from political partisanship. More surprisingly, this
began when Delaware first became a leading home to incorporations a century ago. In fact, the same
thing was true of New Jersey during its brief period of prominence before Delaware. Why?
We suggest that the answer relates to corporate law’s central debate regarding the “market
for corporate law.” In the United States, the internal affairs doctrine allows corporations to choose
the state whose corporate law governs them by incorporating in the jurisdiction of their choice. This
doctrine produces a form of regulatory competition that is structurally biased to produce a winner
that favors “demand-side” interests, i.e., the interests of corporate decision-makers themselves.
Understanding this dynamic has been one of corporate law’s foundational concerns. We complement
that literature by arguing that nonpartisanship provides a competitive advantage in Delaware’s
quest to appeal to these interests. Delaware’s approach enables it to afford great weight to the
interests of nationally diverse and heterogeneous shareholders and makes it less likely that the state
will sacrifice shareholders’ interests to please local constituents. The internal affairs doctrine thus
indirectly works to favor incorporations to a state with a nonpartisan approach.
Our framework also offers new insights into the debate on the federalization of corporate
law and the Supreme Court litigation. Specifically, we argue that within First Amendment
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court can and should carefully consider its ruling’s effects on Delaware
nonpartisanship.
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INTRODUCTION
Partisan politics now seems to be everywhere in corporate law.1 Reforming corporate
governance is increasingly a theme in political debates and legislative proposals,2 and the
view that corporations should aim to directly maximize social interests is gaining
momentum.3 A striking feature of the corporate law governing most large firms, however,
is that its enactment and adjudication are conspicuously shielded from partisan politics.4 The
reason for this is that most large corporations incorporate in Delaware and thus are governed
by its corporate law. As has been widely noted, how Delaware makes corporate law – at both
the legislative and judicial levels – is deeply unusual.5 In particular, Delaware’s Constitution
requires that the Delaware judiciary be balanced between Democratic and Republican judges
and that changes to its corporate code receive supermajority support.6 Although no system
of laws is apolitical, it seems that Delaware’s efforts to immunize its corporate law from
political partisanship may have been a significant contributor to its success in attracting
incorporations.
In 2019, however, one of the pillars of Delaware’s nonpartisan approach was
declared unlawful. In Adams v. Carney, the Third Circuit held that Delaware’s bipartisan
judicial balance requirement violated the First Amendment.7 When certiorari was granted by
the Supreme Court, former Governors and Chief Justices of Delaware as well as a host of
influential scholars submitted amicus briefs to the Court supporting Delaware’s
constitutional provisions, arguing for nonpartisanship’s role in the reputation of Delaware’s
courts as expert arbiters of corporate law.8 Although the Court ultimately avoided the merits
by finding that the challenger lacked standing,9 Justice Sotomayor noted that the
constitutional issues raised by Delaware’s approach “will likely be raised again.”10
Corporate law is not apolitical—as one scholar famously noted, “much of the firm’s
structure is affected, sometimes determined, by its political environment.”11 Corporations’
1

See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Purpose in a Populist Era, 98 NEB. L. REV. 542 (2020)
(discussing the implications of rising populism across the political spectrum on corporate purpose).
2
See, e.g., Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018) (proposing reforms to corporate law
designed to empower workers).
3
See, e.g., David J. Berger, Reconsidering Stockholder Primacy in an Era of Corporate Purpose, 74 BUS.
LAW. 659 (2019) (“In the 1980s, a single ideology transformed American business: stockholder primacy.”);
“Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation,” Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to
Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans,’ BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019).
4
See, e.g., infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
5
See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
6
See infra section III.
7
Adams v. Governor of Delaware, 922 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 2019).
8
Governor of Delaware v Adams, Brief of Amici Curiae Professors in Support of Petitioner.
9
Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 500 (2020).
10
Id. at 503.
11
MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (2003) (“Politics can affect a firm
in many ways: it can determine who owns it, how big it can grow, what it can produce profitably, how it raises
capital, who has the capital to invest, how managers and employees see themselves and one another, and how
authority is distributed inside the firm . . . . [A]nd if we fail to scrutinize the political impact on a firm, we are
unlikely to get the full story.”).
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freedom to incorporate and the competition among states to attract incorporations are core
themes of scholarship in corporate law.12 We complement these important scholarly
literatures on the “market for corporate law” by exploring the role of political partisanship
across states and in Delaware’s success, and in particular the consequences of which political
party controls a state’s government, formulates its laws, and appoints its judiciary.13 It is
worth emphasizing that by “political partisanship” we refer only to the effects of party
control on legislative enactments and the nomination of party-affiliated judges. There are
many other meanings of the term “partisanship” and its cousin “ideology,” but our focus is
specifically on the effects of political party control of government offices.14
This article offers a framework for exploring the role of political partisanship in
corporate law. It begins by showing that there is suggestive empirical evidence for a
relationship between political partisanship and the substance of corporate law at the state
level.15 Although much of corporate law is the same in every state, there remain some
important differences. We explore the predictors of those differences, but make no
conclusive claims of causation.
Among the most politically explosive of all corporate statutes have been the antitakeover statutes passed in waves since the 1980s. These statutes, in various forms, aim to
deter investors from seizing control of a corporation from its incumbent managers. We find
that anti-takeover laws are more likely in states under Democratic control than under
Republican control. We also find that states under Democratic control are significantly more
likely to adopt statutes authorizing hybrid legal forms – legal forms that require companies
formed under them to pursue a public purpose enshrined in their charter, alongside making

12

For a few of many important examples, see, e.g., Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in
Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 709 (1987) (arguing that competition among states improves the
quality of corporate law); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 590 (2003) (arguing
that the threat of federalization checks Delaware and shapes the content of its law); Marcel Kahan & Edward
Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1599-1600 (2005)
(arguing that Delaware law and federal regulation have a mutually supportive relationship in which federal law
supplements Delaware’s common law process in complementary ways); Michael Klausner, Corporations,
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995) (arguing for the importance of network
effects in the market for corporate law). More recently, Christopher Bruner’s work has highlighted the extent
to which only certain kinds of jurisdictions—which he characterizes as “market dominant small
jurisdictions”—can make the kind of credible commitment that Delaware does. CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, REIMAGINING OFFSHORE FINANCE: MARKET-DOMINANT SMALL JURISDICTIONS IN A GLOBALIZING FINANCIAL
WORLD (2016); see also Christopher M. Bruner, Center-Left Politics and Corporate Governance: What Is the
“Progressive” Agenda?, 2 BYU L. REV. (2018). Bruner’s work illuminates a number of other necessary
preconditions for a jurisdiction to function as a locus of incorporations.
13
See Roberta Romano, Market for Corporate Law Redux, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS VOL. 2: PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW (2017) (describing the dynamics of the market for
corporate law). Scholars of corporate law have developed many insights into the “politics” of corporate law in
other senses of that term. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 923, 969-71 (1984).
14
See Edward G. Carmines & Nicholas D’Amico, The New Look in Political Ideology Research, 18 AM. REV.
POL. SCI. 205, 205 (2015).
15
See infra Section II.A.
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profits. We assemble a range of qualitative evidence suggesting that the adoption of these
laws was motivated by politically partisan actors.16
Yet, the state in which most large businesses are incorporated—Delaware—takes a
distinctively nonpartisan approach to corporate law. The process by which Delaware makes
corporate law is explicitly designed to be insulated from political partisanship, and it has
been since Delaware became the principal home to incorporations a century ago. Delaware’s
Constitution requires that the Delaware judiciary be balanced between Democratic and
Republican judges and that changes to its corporate law receive supermajority support.17 The
main source of legislative drafting for any changes to Delaware’s corporate law is not a
political branch, but the Council of the Delaware State Bar Association’s Corporation Law
Section.18 The major arms of Delaware corporate lawmaking—the legislative process and
the courts—have both been carefully immunized from the normal political fray.19
In fact, this nonpartisanship was arguably part of Delaware’s “product pitch” when
it first entered the market for attracting incorporations by out-of-state companies in the late
Nineteenth Century. We return to the debates around Delaware’s Constitution of 1897 to
show that even then, the framers of Delaware’s Constitution were keenly aware of the
dynamics of state competition for corporate charters. During the constitutional debate,
statesman and later Delaware Attorney General and United States Senator William
Saulsbury declared:
I believe, under our general law, in encouraging corporations to take out charters
under the laws of our State . . . . [I]f corporations can be induced to come to our State
to take out their charters and pay their money into our State Treasury and relieve our
people from taxation, instead of going to New Jersey to get their charters,—I would
like to have them come here, and have some of this million dollars a year flowing
into our State Treasury.

See infra Section II.B. To be sure, political affiliation does not determine any individual’s views regarding
corporate law (or anything else for that matter). The Republican and Democratic parties encompass coalitions
with distinct and often conflicting viewpoints, and their legislative proposals reflect complex negotiations
among those coalitions and elected leaders. See, e.g., Carmines & D’Amico, supra note 14. Needless to say,
there are many Democrats (Republicans) who would oppose (support) anti-takeover statutes and support
(oppose) anti-litigation laws. We only provide evidence addressing how party control of government is
associated with certain statutes.
17
See infra Section III.
18
See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1749 (2006); Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 885, 900-01 (1990).
19
See Lawrence Hamermesh, How We Make Law in Delaware, and What to Expect from Us in the Future, 2
J. BUS. & TECH. L. 409, 409-10 (2007) (describing the judiciary and the legislature as the “major player[s] in
the Delaware corporate lawmaking system”). For broader analyses of how Delaware works, there is a vast
literature. For some important examples, see, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware
Corporate Law. Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1017 (1997); Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law and the Legacy
of American Legal Realism, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2019 (2015).
16
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Out of these debates came Delaware’s 1897 Constitution, which called for a general
incorporation law and adopted Delaware’s super-majority requirement for amending its
corporate law.
New Jersey was Delaware’s predecessor in “chartermongering,” and the first state to
make a business of attracting out-of-state corporations.20 At that time, it too was nonpartisan
in its approach to corporate law. In fact, Delaware simply copied most of the features of its
corporate law system from New Jersey. Yet, while trust-busting politics led New Jersey to
dramatically restrict its previously liberal corporate laws (such as those enabling mergers)—
and the subsequent the loss of its popularity for incorporations—Delaware has hewed the
course ever since, maintaining the nonpartisanship of its corporate law from its constitution,
to its legislature, to its judiciary.21 Delaware’s peculiarities and its success raise two
questions: Why might those peculiarities lead to success in attracting incorporations, and is
this system as a whole desirable?
First, why might nonpartisanship be a competitive advantage in the market for
incorporations? We suggest that the answer lies in the distinctive character of U.S. corporate
law. In the United States, corporate law is governed by the internal affairs doctrine, a choice
of law rule under which corporations can freely choose the corporate law governing them
by incorporating in the relevant state.22 This doctrine produces a form of regulatory
competition that has been at the heart of scholarship on corporate law for almost half a
century.23 This literature highlights that this competition is structurally biased to produce a
winner that favors “demand-side” interests, i.e., the interests of corporate decision-makers
themselves.24 We argue that these demand-side interests favor a system for making and
adjudicating corporate law that mutes political partisanship.25
It is important to understand why the interests of corporate decision-makers might
be inconsistent with partisanship. While the day-to-day decision-makers in most
corporations are their managers, corporations ultimately depend on shareholders to raise
20

See Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929, 49 J. ECON. HIS. 677, 677
(1989); see also Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race, Competition for Corporate Charters, and the Rise
and Fall of New Jersey: 1880-1910, 32 J. CORP. L. 323, 326-27, 349-50 (2007).
21
See infra Section III.
22
Historically, a defining feature of U.S. corporate law has been the fact that those creating a corporation can
choose the state in which it is legally formed (i.e., “incorporated”). Under a choice-of-law rule known as the
“internal affairs doctrine,” the law of the state of incorporation governs legal disputes involving the
corporation’s “internal affairs,” regardless of where the corporation is headquartered or does most of its
business. In effect, the internal affairs doctrine lets a corporation choose its corporate law. See VantagePoint
v. Examen, Inc., 871 A. 2d 1108, 1112 (Del. 2005) (“The internal affairs doctrine is a longstanding choice of
law principle which recognizes that only one state should have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal
affairs — the state of incorporation.”).
23
See infra note 12.
24
See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges
We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 683 (2005) (“[C]orporation law in Delaware is influenced by
only the two constituencies whose views are most important in determining where entities incorporate:
managers and stockholders.”).
25
By contrast, the area of financial regulation, which is dominated by the federal government rather than the
states, is arguably more subject to partisan pressures. See Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in
Financial Regulation, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 327, 335 (2013).

6
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equity. As we argue, shareholders, who range from retail investors to various sophisticated
institutions, do not have a clear party affiliation, and they rarely interact as a unified
constituency with local politicians.26 In contrast, state partisan politics will typically be
responsive to the state’s concentrated stakeholders, such as local management or
employees.27 Thus, partisanship presents a risk that shareholders’ interests will be
compromised in favor of another constituency. To the extent that corporate decision-makers
are motivated to protect the interests of shareholders, albeit imperfectly, they must be wary
of such risk. Accordingly, to win the competition for corporate charters, committing to a
politically nonpartisan approach to corporate law is advantageous in attracting a large
number of out-of-state corporations, especially among firms that aim to raise capital from a
broad set of investors.28
Scholars have noted that shareholders lack strong local political connections in
comparison to employees or management, but the implications of this fact for states’
relationship with partisan politics are both interesting and complex.29 Because Delaware’s
corporate law is relatively immune to partisan politics, it can afford greater weight to the
interests of diverse shareholders and is less likely to sacrifice their interests to please local
constituents with strong state party affiliations. In this way, the internal affairs doctrine
mitigates the effects of political partisanship on most large corporations.
This does not mean that the effects of the internal affairs doctrine are politically
neutral or lack an ideological valence.30 Political nonpartisanship, in the sense we use it,
refers to institutions designed to reduce or preclude direct influence by party office-holders.
Such nonpartisanship is not “neutral” in any sense of the term, and it may favor actors with
specific ideologies or the interests of coalitions associated with a specific party. We aim to
open a conversation as to whether Delaware’s siloing of corporate law from politics is
desirable or not.
Our framework offers new insights into a number of normative and empirical issues
in corporate law, including the aftermath of the Supreme Court case that ultimately declined
to rule on Delaware’s requirement of partisan balance in its judiciary. In late 2019, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Carney v. Adams.31 In that case, the Third Circuit
affirmed the invalidation of Delaware statutory provisions that prohibit individuals who are
26

Cf., Da Lin, Corporate Law Can No Longer Ignore Shareholder Heterogeneity, Jotwell (May 6, 2020)
(reviewing Ann M. Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, 44 J. CORP. L. 297 (2019)).
27
See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 60 (1993) (suggesting why the
large number of firms incorporated (but not located) in Delaware reduces any specific firm’s managerial
influence and makes for broader interests than most states where “the local corporate bar tends to be more
aligned with incumbent management”).
28
Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory Dualism As A Development Strategy:
Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 512 (2011).
29
See infra Section IV.
30
Indeed, all of these terms are multifaceted and ambiguous. We focus on the consequences of party control
over statutory and judicial outcomes, but emphasize that reasonable judgments as to what partisanship,
nonpartisanship, and ideology mean will routinely disagree. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Several
Meanings of “Politics” in Judicial Politics Studies: Why “Ideological Influence” is not “Partisanship”, 61
EMORY L.J. 758 (2012).
31
Carney v. Adams, 140 S. Ct. 602 (2019).
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not members of the Democratic or Republican party from serving on the Delaware Supreme
Court, the Court of Chancery, or the Delaware Superior Court and require that no more than
a “bare majority” of judges on those courts belong to one party. The case, inspired by a law
review article,32 was ultimately disposed of on other grounds, but the constitutionality of
Delaware’s bipartisan judiciary requirement is likely to be raised in the future. We argue that
given First Amendment jurisprudence, it is appropriate for any court considering this issue
to give considerable weight to Delaware’s interest in a maintaining the nonpartisanship of
its judiciary.33
This article makes several contributions. It provides new quantitative and qualitative
evidence of the links between political party control and the substance of corporate law; it
shows how Delaware’s century-old constitutional provisions laid the foundation for
nonpartisan corporate law; and it links the literature around the “market for corporate
control” with the themes of political partisanship and nonpartisanship.
It proceeds as follows. Section I lays out a simple framework for examining political
partisanship in corporate law. Section II develops empirical findings that suggest that
partisan politics affects the substance of corporate law at the state level. Section III describes
role of nonpartisanship in Delaware’s dominance in the market for firm incorporations.
Section IV explains the advantages of nonpartisanship in attracting firms’ incorporations by
providing a commitment to corporate interests, and the conditions necessary for
nonpartisanship to serve this commitment credibly. Section V briefly discusses the political
legitimacy of nonpartisanship. Section VI addresses the policy implications of our analysis
in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision.
I.

A FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP IN CORPORATE LAW

What is the role of political partisanship in corporate law? This Section provides a
brief framework for conceptualizing this question. Our framework is developed around three
analytical building blocks: (1) the impact of partisan politics on the substance of corporate
law at the state level, (2) the system of federalism that allows firms to choose their state of
incorporation, and (3) the extent to which commitment to nonpartisanship in the making and
adjudication of corporate law attracts incorporations.
First, we explore the state-level politics of corporate law. We offer qualitative and
quantitative evidence that suggests a partisan character to several consequential state
corporate law developments. Much of corporate law is uniform across all the states and much
of corporate law may be inconsequential. We focus on some of the most important corporate
law statutes that actually differ across jurisdictions, specifically anti-takeover statutes and
laws that allow firms to exempt mangers from liability for violating their fiduciary duties.
We find suggestive evidence of differences between the statutes adopted by governments
Joel Edan Friedlander, Is Delaware’s ‘Other Major Political Party’ Really Entitled to Half of Delaware’s
Judiciary?, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 1139 (2016).
33
While judges of both political stripes would likely retain an interest in preserving Delaware’s status as the
leading state for incorporations, and thus the character of its corporate law, it is possible that removing this
requirement in the state constitution would allow for the eventual deterioration of its nonpartisanship over
time.
32
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controlled by each of the major parties. Loosely speaking, Democrats favor anti-takeover
and pro-stakeholder statutes, while Republicans favor statutes that restrict the liability of
corporate managers for violating fiduciary duties.
Second, we step back to address how the system of corporate law shapes the way
that politics affects corporations themselves. In the United States, a choice of law rule known
as the “internal affairs doctrine” empowers corporations to choose the state in which they
incorporate.34 Because the law of the state of incorporation governs a corporation’s internal
affairs—including the allocation of powers among its shareholders, directors, and officers—
corporations can choose their corporate law regardless of where they are headquartered by
incorporating in that jurisdiction. Incorporation is a “paper choice” that requires no
operations in that state and which can be done at relatively low cost and friction on the basis
of a jurisdiction’s attractiveness. The result is that a corporation’s choice of corporate law
can be analogized to purchasing a product that states offer in return for incorporation fees,
and the system as a whole can be characterized as a “market for corporate law.”35 The debate
as to whether this market produces a “race to the top” in which states compete to provide
optimal corporate governance and firms incorporate en masse in that state, or a “race to the
bottom” in which states compete to attract self-interested management at shareholders’
(and/or society’s) expense has proved one of the most fundamental and enduring questions
of corporate scholarship.36 For our purposes, what is important is to understand how
partisanship may affect firms’ incorporation decisions within a system that permits such
choices.
34

See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (addressing the internal affairs
doctrine and noting “No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State’s
authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define the voting rights of
shareholders.”).
35
See Romano, supra note 13. In particular, because the frictions to out-of-state incorporation or
reincorporation are quite low—certainly in comparison to the relocation of a firm’s actual headquarters—both
of the dynamics noted above will occur. As Romano puts it: “(1) firms will seek out the jurisdiction with their
preferred corporate law . . . and (2) states will compete to offer laws that attract or retain domestic corporations
to increase state coffers.” Romano, id., at 360. A sub-theme in this literature addresses how much of a race
among states there actually is, as most states do not actively seek to attract incorporations. Marcel Kahan &
Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition In Corporate Law, 55 STAN L. REV. 679 (2002). For our purposes,
however, whether the race is sluggish or vigorous, the key is that many corporations eventually move.
36
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974)
(arguing that Delaware occupies an outsized role in corporate lawmaking to the detriment of national corporate
policy); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEG.
STUD. 251 (1977); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering
the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 561-63 (2002); Roberta Romano, The State
Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 709 (1987); Roe, supra note 12, at 590. More
recently, scholars have noted the interaction of the federal government with state-level competition in the
provision of corporate law. While the welfare effects of recent federal interventions are fiercely contested, it
seems undeniable that the specter of federal intervention affects how states compete. See, e.g., Roberta
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1524
(2005); John C. Coffee, The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated
and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, CORNELL L. REV. (2012). The result is what Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock
have memorably called a “symbiotic” relationship between Delaware and federal corporate law. Kahan &
Rock, supra note 12, at 1599-1600.
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Third, we develop the interaction of the first and second building blocks by arguing
that corporate law’s jurisdictional competition promotes the emergence of a state that offers
a nonpartisan approach to corporate law as part of its “product.” There are several important
reasons for this feature. Shareholders, the providers of risk capital to corporations, are a
diffuse national group.37 An approach to corporate law that is porous to a state’s partisan
politics is likely to be inconsistent with promoting the interests of nationally diffuse
shareholders over the long-term. Relatedly, because corporate law is a deeply technical body
of law, its quality is highly dependent on expertise, which may be inconsistent with a partisan
bias towards specific outcomes. Even the more generic attributes of Delaware’s corporate
law approach, such as its legislature’s lauded responsiveness to corporations38 and doctrinal
flexibility,39 may be more difficult to sustain in the face of political partisanship.
As a result, nonpartisanship in the creation and adjudication of corporate law
provides a competitive advantage for a state interested in winning the jurisdictional race.
This provides an account of why Delaware emerged as the winner that is complementary to
the existing literature.40 It also explains the loss of New Jersey’s lead as the turn of the
century approached.
To recap, understanding how partisan politics and corporate law interact requires
exploring three distinct sets of questions. First, it requires setting the baseline by addressing
the state-of-play in the states: Does partisan politics generally affect how corporate law is
made? Second, it requires understanding the place of partisan politics in how corporate law
is made in Delaware. Lastly, if Delaware’s approach to partisan politics and corporate law
is different from other states, it requires an account of why. Roberta Romano insightfully
described Delaware as a credible “hostage” to corporate interests.41 Here, we delve into the
“black box” of what is necessary to be a credible hostage in terms of how partisan politics
affects a jurisdiction’s law. While nonpartisanship has a causally thorny relationship with
whether a jurisdiction can be credibly “hostage” to corporate interests, we suggest that a
nonpartisan corporate lawmaking process seems akin to a necessary but not sufficient
37

See infra Section IV.
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 225
(1985).
39
As is well-known, Delaware corporate law emphasizes the fiduciary duties of corporate managers, and the
law of those duties depends largely on standards rather than bright line rules. Administering such rules requires
business acumen and adaptability to changing economic conditions. Jill Fisch, The Peculiar Role of Delaware
Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CINN. L. REV. 1061 (2000). For example, Delaware
law has arguably changed to become more deferential to managers due to the increase in sophistication and
size of institutional shareholders. See Steven Davidoff Solomon and Randall S. Thomas, The Rise and Fall of
Delaware’s Takeover Standards, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING
UP? (Steven Davidoff Solomon ed. 2019).
40
While, to our knowledge, no article has systematically focused on the role of political partisanship, other
scholars have observed the importance of closely related features of Delaware, such as its lack of a strong instate corporate constituency. See, e.g., Adam C. Pritchard, London as Delaware?, 78 U. CINN. L. REV. 473,
475 (2009) (“Delaware has prevailed in that competition by being highly attuned to demands by directors . . .
. That responsiveness is driven, in part, by its small population and relatively insignificant share of the U.S.
economy. Delaware has very few public companies, which limits the number of managers and shareholders
who might seek to influence the direction of its corporate law.”).
41
See Romano, supra note 38, at 240, 278.
38
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condition for dominating the market for incorporations. Conversely, the demographic
characteristics that have enabled Delaware’s “hostage” status have also made durable
nonpartisanship a feasible strategy.
The product of this analysis explains the structure of our paper. We explore
partisanship in the states (Section II), partisanship in Delaware (Section III), and then seek
to explain why Delaware is so conspicuously nonpartisan (Section IV).
II.

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PARTISANSHIP IN STATES’ CORPORATE LAWMAKING

In this Part, we examine whether political partisanship may have an impact on the
substance of corporate law. To evaluate whether party affiliation can predict corporate law
legislation, we examine whether certain types of corporate laws are more likely to be adopted
when the state is controlled by Democrats or by Republicans. We discuss three types of
corporate laws: anti-takeover statutes, anti-litigation laws and hybrid legal forms that have
a blended profit-social mission.42

A. Data
We create a panel dataset that tracks whether each state legislature and governor are
Democratic or Republican, and the adoption of different types of corporate laws over time.43
We omit from the analysis the District of Columbia because it is a federal state, and Nebraska
because its state representatives do not formally affiliate with political parties.
The data contains variables that specify whether the state governor is a Democrat or
a Republican, and the fraction of members in both the House of Representatives and Senate
that are Democrats or Republicans. We code a state as Democratic if in a given year the
governor is a Democrat and the majorities in both the Senate and the House are Democrat.
Likewise, we code a state as Republican if the governor is a Republican and both the Senate
and the House are controlled by Republicans. Note that this means that each state may be
and often is neither Democrat nor Republican. This approach focuses on when both the
legislature and the executive share the same political vision. While some studies, such as
those relating to the effect of party affiliation on taxes, focus mainly on the legislature,44 the

42

See, e.g., John T. Jost, Christopher M. Federico, Jaime L. Napier, Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions,
and Elective Affinities, 60 ANNUAL REV. PSYCH. 307 (2009).
43
The data on the legislatures and governors of each state across time is sourced from the University of
Kentucky Center for Poverty Research, which collects panel data on states’ politics and various economic
measures since 1980. See National Welfare Data, U. KY. CTR. FOR POVERTY RES.,
http://ukcpr.org/resources/national-welfare-data (last visited February 14, 2020).
44
Robert W. Reed, Democrats, Republicans, and Taxes: Evidence that Political Parties Matter, J. OF PUB.
ECON., May 2006, at 725-750.
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involvement of state governors in the process of advocating and adopting state corporate
laws45 suggests that coordinated executive and legislative action may be necessary.46
The data on state corporate law is based mainly on data collected for several recent
studies of state corporate law across time,47 and data collected specifically for this project.
We focus on three main areas of laws that are consequential and differ among states. The
first two relate to what are generally considered key areas of corporate law: anti-takeover
statutes and laws that protect firms and managers from litigation. These statutes have been
subject to numerous studies that debate and test their impact on firm value and performance,
as well as other outcomes, such as takeovers and litigation, and they appear to affect firm
incorporation decisions.48 We emphasize that we do not take a view on these issues in this
article. The key point is that they were plausibly important when adopted and that party
politics may be associated with their adoption. The third group of statutes relate to the recent
adoption of legal forms that subject corporate managers to duties to pursue broader social
objectives, primarily the Benefit Corporation.49 These laws provide a good setting for testing
whether corporate law may be subject to party politics because they implicate broader
“stakeholder” issues, such as unemployment, inequality, diversity, and the environment.
Antitakeover statutes: There are seven main forms of anti-takeover statutes.50 (a)
Business Combination Statutes: These statutes bar a bidder that obtains control from
merging the target with an entity of its own for a defined period, unless stringent conditions
are satisfied. (b) Constituency Statutes: These statutes explicitly empower management to
consider the interests of corporate constituencies other than shareholders in defending
against a takeover. (c) Control Share Acquisition Statutes: These statutes require a
shareholder vote to permit a hostile bidder to proceed with its offer, and preclude the bidder
from voting shares it acquires if it does not do so. (d) Fair-price Statutes: These statutes
require a bidder who obtains control and undertakes a second-step freeze-out transaction to
45

See e.g., Robert Daines, Shelley Xin Li & Charles C.Y. Wang, Can Staggered Boards Improve Value?
Evidence from the Massachusetts Natural Experiment 4 (Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law &
Econ., Paper No. 498, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2836463 (describing Michael Dukakis’s involvement in
pushing forward a law that would require Massachusetts firms to adopt staggered boards).
46
In addition, Reed, supra note 44, uses the average Democratic and Republican control in a five year period
prior to the relevant policy. All our results are robust to this specification.
47
Michal Barzuza, The State of State Antitakeover Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 1973 (2009); Cain, Matthew D.,
Stephen B. McKeon, and Steven Davidoff Solomon, Do Takeover Laws Matter? Evidence from Five Decades
of Hostile Takeovers, 124(3) J. FIN. ECON. 464 (2017); Ofer Eldar and Lorenzo Magnolfi, Regulatory
Competition and the Market for Corporate Law, 12(2) AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 60 (2020).
48
See e.g., Ofer Eldar, Can Lax Corporate Law Increase Shareholder Value? Evidence from Nevada 61 J.L.
& ECON. 555, 556 (2018) (noting that several proxy statements from firms reincorporating to Nevada list as a
motivating factor Nevada’s law insulating managers from lawsuits, and commenting that incorporating in
states allowing greater freedom to defend against takeovers may help managers focus on long-term growth).
49
See e.g., Ofer Eldar, Designing Business Forms to Pursue Social Goals, 106 VA. L. REV. 937 (2020); J.
Haskell Murray, Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise: Comparing the State Statutes, (January 15, 2015)
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988556).
50
See Eldar & Magnolfi, supra note 47; Lucian Arye Bebchuck, and Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to
Incorporate, 46 J. L. & ECON. 383 (2003); Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on
Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1795-1873 (2002).
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remove remaining shareholders to pay the same price at the second step that it paid for shares
in the initial bid. (e) Poison Pill Statutes: These statutes protect poison pills, arguably the
most effective form of anti-takeover protection, from judicial review.51 (f) Extreme: antitakeover protections that make it extremely difficult to acquire firms without the
acquiescence of the target board. These include laws that require firms to adopt staggered
boards,52 disgorgement statutes53 and laws that validate dead-hand poison pills.54
Anti-Litigation Laws: Since 1986, virtually all states have adopted laws that permit
firms to waive managers’ duty of care. However, some states have gone further and adopted
laws empowering firms to exempt managers from some elements of the duty of loyalty.
There are broadly three types of such laws. (a) Loyalty Waiver: a broad waiver that
essentially exempts directors and/or officers from most, if not all, aspects of the duty of
loyalty and renders them liable when they engage in fraud or a knowing violation of the law.
The liability exemptions under Nevada law have been well documented and discussed,55 but
as many as twenty-three states have adopted similar laws, such as Virginia and Maryland.56
(b) Business Judgment Rule (“BJR”) Protection: some states have adopted specific statutory
provisions that accord managers’ decisions business judgment protection, even in the context
of takeovers.57 These laws essentially curb substantive judicial review of managerial
decisions in defending against takeovers, and protect their validity from being challenged in
court for possible unfairness.58 (c) Universal Demand: laws that mandate that shareholders
make a demand on the board to initiate derivative lawsuits, typically against managers for
breach of fiduciary duties against the corporation.59 In contrast, in states that do not have
universal demand laws, shareholders are not required to make such a demand if the demand
51

A poison pill consists of the issuance of warrants or rights to shareholders that allow the holders to purchase
corporate stock at a materially lower price than a party who has triggered the pill’s rights by purchasing a block
of stock without board waiver of the pill.
52
These laws typically allow firms to opt out of the staggered board by an amendment to the company’s charter
(see e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 156D, § 8.06), but this means that the board has to initiate this action before
shareholders get to approve this decision. See Daines et. al, supra note 45. Steven J. Cleveland, A Failure of
Substance and a Failure of Process: The Circular Odyssey of Oklahoma’s Corporate Law Amendments in
2010, 2012, and 2013, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 221 (2014).
53
A disgorgement statute requires a bidder to disgorge profits from a failed bid. As a result, it bars a bidder
from generating revenue by selling target shares back at a higher price. See Subramanian, supra note 50, at
1857-1859.
54
See Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 2-405.1(d); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-727.1. Dead-hand poison pills are
pills that cannot be redeemed even by a new board of directors; see Eldar & Magnolfi, supra note 47.
55
See Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L.
REV. 935 (2012); Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, Nevada and the Market for Corporate Law, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1165 (2011); Michal Barzuza and David C. Smith, What happens in Nevada? Selfselecting into Lax Law, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 3593 (2014); Dain C. Donelson and Christopher G. Yust. Litigation
Risk and Agency Costs: Evidence from Nevada Corporate Law. 57(3) J.L. & ECON., 747 (2014); Ofer Eldar,
Can Lax Corporate Law Increase Shareholder Value? Evidence from Nevada 61 J.L. & ECON. 555 (2018).
56
See Md. Corp. & Assns. § 2-405.2 and Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-692.1. See also Eldar & Magnolfi, supra note
47.
57
E.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 78.139.
58
See Barzuza, supra note 55, at 955-957.
59
Ian
Appel,
Governance
by
Litigation,
(July
1,
2019)
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2532278).
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would be futile, mainly because the board or some members thereof are also the defendants
in such lawsuits.60 (d) Corporate Opportunity Waiver (“COW”): waivers that enable
directors and/or controlling shareholders to appropriate business opportunities that would
otherwise belong to the corporation, even if they do not disclose these opportunities to the
corporation nor receive permission to pursue them. Nine states starting with Delaware in
2000 adopted these waivers.61
Hybrid Legal Forms: The hybrid legal forms that have proliferated across states in
recent years come in several varieties. We divide them into Benefit Corporation statutes and
all other statutes. (a) Benefit Corporations: Legal corporate forms that requires a firm formed
under the statute to adopt at least one public purpose in its charter, and require or in some
cases permit the directors to pursue these public purposes.62 (b) Other Hybrid Forms: the
most common is the Low-Income Limited Liability Company (“L3C”), which is essentially
an LLC that is formed for a charitable purpose.63 Other legal forms include some
idiosyncratic forms, such as the social purpose corporation, the public benefit corporation,
and the public benefit LLC.64 These forms differ from one another with respect to several
legal characteristics, including the underlying form (corporation or LLC), whether the
managers are required or permitted to pursue social purposes, and the level of disclosure
required with respect to the performance of the social purpose. We lump these entity forms
together, because it is unlikely that these differences are driven by the states’ party
affiliation, and because the variations among states is relatively small.
In Table 1, we provide descriptive statistics on our sample. It consists of 1,862 stateyear observations covering the period from 1980 to 2017. Twenty-six percent of the
observations are states that are subject to Democratic control and twenty-two percent are
states under Republican control. Note that many states became Republican over time, such
that before 2008 only 16% of state-year observations were Republican, and from 2008 about
39% are Republican. In 100 state-year observations, a state passes at least one antitakeover
statute. Thirty-nine percent of these are Democratic and only eleven percent are Republican.
This suggests that anti-takeover statutes are more likely under Democratic governments,
although note that most of these statutes were passed before 2007 when the percentage of
Republican states was much lower. The picture is somewhat more balanced and eclectic
when examining the 52 instances where states pass anti-litigation statutes: 19% and 23%
percent of state-year observations are Democratic and Republican, respectively. It is
noteworthy that duty of loyalty waivers and universal demand laws were passed by more
Republican states, mainly before 2008, when the percentage of Republican states was
relatively low. Finally, Democratic and Republican states are relatively balanced when
considering hybrid legal forms (39% and 36%, respectively). Note, however, that the first

60

Id.
See Gabriel Rauterberg and Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical
Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075 (2017).
62
See Eldar, supra note 49, at 20.
63
Id., at n. 75.
64
See Murray, supra note 49, at 4.
61
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hybrid legal form was passed in 2008, when the percentage of Democratic states was
substantially lower than Republican states.
B. Empirical Strategy
For the empirical analysis, we use a standard regression analysis that takes the
following four forms:65
(1)
𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝐷𝑒𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑝 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡 + 𝜂𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡 ,
(3)

(2)
𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝐷𝑒𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑝 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡 + µ𝑡 + dr + 𝜂𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡 ,
𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝐷𝑒𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑝 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑠𝑡 + µ𝑡 + 𝑑𝑟 + 𝜂𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡 , and
(4)

𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝐷𝑒𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑝 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑠𝑡 + λ𝑟𝑡 + 𝜂𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡 .

where the dependent variable, 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑡 , is an indicator variable that equals one if state 𝑠 passes
the relevant law in year 𝑡. The main variables of interests are Democrat (𝐷𝑒𝑚s𝑡 ) and
Republican (𝑅𝑒𝑝s𝑡 ). Each equals one when the party of the governor and the majority of
each house is Democrat or Republican, as applicable. The regression model accounts for
unobserved characteristics of states by including random state fixed effects (𝜂𝑠 ).66 For
example, a state may be reluctant to adopt any laws that relate to corporate law because it
has other priorities. We do not include any observable controls in the first specification in
equation (1).
In equation (2), we include a range of indicator variables (also known as fixed
effects). These include year indicators (µ𝑡 ) that account for unobserved trends across states
that may cause states to adopt certain laws. For example, a merger wave may lead many
states to adopt anti-takeover statutes in a given year, irrespective of the political affiliation
of the state. We further control for regional indicators (dr ).67 This addresses the concern
that the passage of the relevant law may be driven by unobserved regional characteristics
rather than party affiliation. For example, a particular region may have a political leaning
towards laws that deter market-oriented transactions, such as takeovers and external
investments in local assets.
In equation (3), we include a variety of state-year controls (𝑋𝑠𝑡 ). First, the main
control we include is Largest Local Firm. This variable is the log of the number of employees
of the firm with the largest number of employees which is headquartered in the state.
Legislators of either political stripe might be more amenable to adopting statutes, primarily
anti-takeover statutes, when convinced that they are necessary to save a large local employer,
and where the management of the lobbying firm aligns with other local constituencies, such

65

The results are robust to using other models, such as the probit and logit models.
It is not possible to include state fixed effects in the regression because of the limited number of instances in
which the dependent variable can equal one, and the limited time-variation in the data.
67
We divide the U.S. into nine regions based on the Census region classification: New England, the Middle
Atlantic, the South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, East North Central, West North Central,
the Mountain region, and West Pacific.
66
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as unions and community groups.68 Second, we control for Lawyers defined as the log of the
number of lawyers in the state in a given year.69 The rationale is that lawyers may constitute
an interest group that lobbies for a particular set of laws on behalf of itself or its clients. They
might want laws that encourage litigation, or alternatively, they could lobby for laws that
protect the managers that retain these lawyers. There is evidence that the corporate bar is
highly influential in lobbying states to adopt different corporate laws.70
In addition, we control for other state characteristics that could possibly affect the
probability of adopting corporate laws: Unions defined as the percentage of (non-farmer)
employees in the state that are members of a union; Population, defined the log of the
number of people that reside in the state; Unemployment Rate and Poverty Rate, which are
simply the unemployment and poverty rates in each state in a given year; and Avg. Income,
which is the total personal income of people residing in the state in a given year divided by
the state population in that year. Finally, in equation (4), we add on further controls for
region-year fixed effects to control for various unobserved temporary shocks that may have
affected specific regions, and could potentially affect the probability of adopting corporate
laws.71
We emphasize that in running the regressions we only include in each sample stateyear observations when there is a realistic likelihood that the relevant corporate law statute
will be passed. A well-known aspect of state corporate law is that state corporate laws are
virtually never repealed.72 For example, when, say, a Poison Pill statute is passed, as a matter
of fact, it is never repealed. Accordingly, we do not include observations of states that have
already passed the relevant statutes. For example, if a state already adopted all the relevant
anti-takeover statutes by 2000, we do not include the observations for that state after 2000.
In addition, we only include state-year observations from the first year in which the relevant
law was passed. For example, the regressions for hybrid legal forms include only
observations from 2008 because the first statute was passed in 2008.

68

See Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 121-122 (1987)
(postulating that managers of large companies may create coalitions with organized labor and community
groups in lobbying for antitakeover statutes, and that these coalitions are particularly effective in areas where
the relocation of a single firm is likely to affect the local economy). As discussed infra Section II.D, there is
plenty of anecdotal evidence that suggests that a key motivation for enacting an anti-takeover statute is to
protect a large firm that employs many state residents.
69
We use the number of lawyers rather than the percentage of lawyers in the state because the relevant variable
is the size of the legal market. For example, even if the percentage of lawyers in the population is relatively
high, lawyers would likely not have much of an impact on legislation if their number is small. In any case, in
unreported regressions, we use the percentage of lawyers in each state as a control variable, and the results are
qualitatively the same.
70
See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate
Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987); Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for
Corporate Governance?, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y no. 2, 2005, at 212-231.
71
Note that in this specification, there is no need to control for year and region fixed effects because they are
all absorbed by the year-region fixed effects.
72
One rare exception is the repeal of the Oklahoma law that required Oklahoma to adopt a staggered board.
See Cleveland, supra note 52.
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C. Results
We first examine anti-takeover statutes. Table 2 shows the results for a specification
where 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑡 equals one if a state passed one of the antitakeover statutes described above in
a given year.73 The results show that when a state is subject to a Democratic government, it
is 3.3%-4.7% more likely to pass an anti-takeover statute. The coefficient on Republican is
not statistically significant in most specifications except in the first column, in which it is
negative and statistically significant. Interestingly, the coefficient on Largest Local Firm is
positive and in column 3, statistically significant. Based on column 3, one standard deviation
in Largest Local Firm is associated with 1.1% higher probability of adopting one antitakeover statute in a given year. Our main interest is to compare the coefficients on Democrat
and Republican. We use the Wald statistic to do so. If the Wald statistic is large, then we can
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal. The table also reports the p-values
for the one-sided tests for the null hypothesis that the coefficient on Democrat is larger than
Republican (and vice se versa). As shown in Table 2, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis
that Democrat is larger than Republican at a statistically significant level. That is, there is
less than a 5 percent probability that the coefficient on Republican is higher than Democrat.
This suggests that anti-takeover laws are more likely under democratic control than under
republican control.
In Table 3, we show the results for anti-litigation laws. In contrast to anti-takeover
statutes, we do not find good predictors of these laws. Importantly, neither the coefficients
on Democrat or Republican are statistically significant, nor are they statistically different
from one another. In Table 4, we show the result for hybrid legal forms. Here we observe a
positive and statistically significant coefficient on Democrat in column 1, and a statistically
significant difference from the coefficient on Republican at the 1% level. The coefficient on
Democrat however is not statistically significant in the specifications in other columns.
Nonetheless, in columns 2 through 5, the difference between the coefficients on Democrat
and Republican is statistically significant, and it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis
that Democrat is larger than Republican at the 5 or 10 percent level (depending on the
specification). These regressions suggest that the likelihood of adopting a hybrid legal form
is about 6% higher under a democratic regime.
Finally, in Table 5, we look at individual statutes.74 Interestingly, the association
between Democrat and anti-takeover statutes is primarily derived from Constituency
Statutes, and to some extent the Extreme statutes (presumably, the statutes that require firms
to adopt staggered boards). Not surprisingly, the association between Hybrid Forms and
Democrat is mainly driven by the adoption of benefit corporations as shown in column 11.
73

Column 1 corresponds to the regression model in equation (1). Column 2 corresponds to the model in
equation (2). Columns 3 and 4 correspond to equation (4), and column 5 corresponds to equation (4). The same
applies to Tables 3 and 4.
74
In this table, we show the specifications with year and region fixed effects and Largest Local Firm as control
variables. The rationale is that when evaluating individual statutes, the variation in the data is very limited, so
we only include the fixed effects and the only variable that appears to have an association with some statutes
(i.e., Largest Local Firm). Moreover, it is questionable whether controls, such as population and union
membership, should be included in the first place because they may affect the likelihood of Democratic or
Republican control.
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Interestingly, although the results in Table 3 did not suggest any relationship between party
control and anti-litigation laws, we observe that loyalty waivers and universal demand are
2.88 percent and 1.91 respectively more likely in Republican states than in Democrat states.
Overall, the results suggest that party-affiliation is associated with corporate law
making. In particular, we observe that Democratic control is associated with anti-takeover
legislation, particularly constituency statutes that permit managers to consider the interests
of a broader set of stakeholders. This is also consistent with the finding that Democrats tend
to pass laws that facilitate the adoption of hybrid forms. These forms are essentially firms
with strong constituency statutes that require managers to pursue social goals.75 Although
we do not find that anti-litigation statutes are associated with Republican control, there is
some evidence that a subset of them, specifically loyalty waivers and universal demand laws
are more likely under Republican rather than Democratic control.
It is important to emphasize that the empirical analysis does not lend itself to strong
claims about causal inference. The evidence is strictly correlational. However, the findings
are consistent with anecdotal evidence that Democrats tend to oppose hostile takeovers and
favor an idealistic notion of corporations that maximize social goals. Likewise, the idea that
Republicans are less likely to trust judicial second-guessing of managerial discretion seems
plausible. Moreover, no other variable, including unemployment rates or even union
membership, seems to explain the passage of corporate laws. Thus, taken together, the results
suggest that party affiliation does play a role in the corporate law-making of most states.
D. Qualitative Evidence
Because the results are largely suggestive, we also search for qualitative evidence
from the passage of specific statutes. We look into corporate law statutes that attracted
substantial attention in the media and legal scholarship, and we examine their legislative
history. To the extent that the evidence from legislative debates and voting records is
consistent with the empirical findings, it supports a claim that our results are not merely
correlational, but may in fact suggest a causal relationship between political partisanship and
certain types of corporate laws.76 As we show below, the anecdotal evidence indeed supports
the empirical findings, showing that Democrats tend to be more supportive of anti-takeover
statutes and hybrid legal forms, and Republicans more open to anti-litigation laws.
Perhaps the most heavily debated statute that generated intense controversy and
national interest was Delaware’s business combination statute, which is Delaware’s only
anti-takeover statute to date.77 The bill was designed to deter certain hostile takeovers, and
was proposed in the late 1980s, when anxiety over the effects of corporate raiders like Ivan
Note that our findings are consistent with Mark Roe’s account of comparative corporate structure. He finds
that left-leaning social democracies “induce managers to stray further than otherwise from their shareholders’
profit-maximizing goals,” and that “the modern means that align managers with diffuse stockholders in the
United States [which include] hostile takeovers and strong shareholder-wealth maximization norms – have
been weaker and sometimes denigrated” by those left-leaning social democracies. See Roe, supra note 11 at 2.
76
To be sure, this evidence itself is imperfect; in many instances, legislative history of specific statutes is not
available, or the relevant laws passed with minimal debate. Further, most legislators tend not to be experts in
corporate law, and may not understand the nuances of the legislation they are asked to pass.
77
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203.
75
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Boesky and T. Boone Pickens loomed large in public debate. The bill was authored by the
Corporate Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association,78 and was the subject of many
hours of testimony from various stakeholders across the political spectrum. Many
proponents of the bill maintained that it was a thoroughly bipartisan effort,79 and the bill
passed the Republican-controlled House and Democrat-controlled Senate with only a single
opposing vote.80 Nonetheless, partisan sentiment spilled over in the hearings, with more
Republican voices opposing the bill, and more Democrat ones supporting it.81 To take one
example, a Senator questioning Joseph Grundfest, then a commissioner of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and now a Stanford law professor, stated: “The Reagan years have
been characterized by deregulation. We had the Ivan Boesky scandal where the problem
was greed and greed being the American way. We have had the takeovers by 51% of wellrun companies with money in the bank. Employees can be sacrificed, meaning salaries,
benefits, protections for families. What’s your reaction to that point of view?”82 In response,
Grundfest said: “Well as far as the Reagan administration is concerned, I’m commissioner
at an independent agency, and I’m a democrat, but we operate in a competitive marketplace
and unless we operate lean and mean, there aren’t going to be jobs to save in this country. .
. ”83 Thus, while support for the legislation was ultimately bipartisan, the discussion in the
legislative hearings suggests that it was vigorously supported by democrats opposing the
wave of hostile takeovers.
Another highly publicized piece of legislation was the 1990 Massachusetts law that
mandated staggered boards for all firms incorporated in Massachusetts.84 The law was the
result of intense lobbying by Norton Company, which was defending against a hostile
takeover by British company BTR.85 Norton lobbied its mayor and all its legislative

78

Joint Hearing Before the Judiciary Committee, HB 396 (Jan. 21, 1988) [Joint Hearing Judiciary Committee
1988_0121 – 4.mp3].
79
See, e.g., id., Statement of Bruce Stargate, past president of Delaware State Bar Association who assisted in
drafting the bill [at 38:56] (“[This] is a bill that deserves bipartisan support from both sides of the aisle.”)
80
See Senate Roll Call for HB 396 (1988) [HS1 for HB 396_134th_Senate debate.mp3] (recording a voice
vote of 19-1); House Roll Call for HB 396 [HS1 for HB 396_134th_House debate 2.mp3] (recording a voice
vote of 39-0).
81
See, e.g., Statement of Nell Minnow, Director of Center for Corporate Governance at Cordozo Law School,
Joint Hearing Before the Judiciary Committee, HB 396 (Jan. 20, 1988) [Joint Hearing Judiciary Committee
1988_0120 – 5 at 2:06] (“The circulation of this draft was enough to cause that bastion of free market
conservatism, the Wall Street Journal, to call for federal preemption.”); Statement of John Robins, Delaware
State Capital Council, Joint Hearing Before the Judiciary Committee, HB 396 (Jan. 21, 1988) [Joint Hearing
Judiciary Committee 1988_0121 – 2.mp3 at 35:45] (“There are not many times when management and unions
agree, but this is one of those rare and important occasions. . . . I can tell you that the little guy, the average
worker, supports this legislation.”)
82
Statement of unidentified Senator questioning Joseph Grundfest, Securities and Exchange Commission, Joint
Hearing Before the Judiciary Committee, HB 396 (Jan. 20, 1988) [Joint Hearing Judiciary Committee
1988_0120 – 2 at 55:10].
83
Id.
84
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 50A, ch. 156D, § 8.06(b)–(g) (2005 & Supp. 2011).
85
Joan Vennochi and Elsa C. Arnett, Antitakeover bill on Dukakis’ desk; BTR undaunted by Legislature’s
speedy OK, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 19, 1990.
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representatives to create House Bill 5666.86 The bill was pushed forward by Worcester
Democratic Representative Kevin O’Sullivan and the Democratic Governor Michael
Dukakis. Although the bill allowed companies to opt out of the staggered board requirement,
doing so required a vote of the board, or a vote of two thirds of the shareholders which could
not take place until 1992.87 BTR’s offer forced a tight deadline,88 and within hours of
committee approval, the bill had passed both Democratically-controlled (though minimally
staffed)89 houses and was signed by the Democrat governor, Michael Dukakis.90 Thus, while
the BTR’s offer no doubt was the initial inspiration for the law, decisive action by Democrats
facilitated its passing.
Similar evidence comes from the passage of corporate legislation in Oklahoma and
Iowa. In Oklahoma, the board of Chesapeake, one of Oklahoma’s largest companies, was
facing pressure to de-stagger and a potential hostile takeover from Carl Icahn.91 In order to
pass the bill quickly, the brief language mandating staggered boards was written by
Chesapeake itself and added to an already in-progress, 115-page bill reforming partnership
law.92 The staggered board requirement passed both houses of the legislature with virtually
no discussion by legislators, and only three votes against,93 all by Republicans.94 A similar
bill in Iowa was passed to protect a local company, Casey’s, that spent six months and vast
resources fighting off what its management thought was an “inadequate and opportunistic”
takeover offer.95 The bill swiftly passed the Democrat-controlled Senate and the
Republican-controlled House;96 all votes in opposition were Republican.97 Although these
statutes passed without full Democratic legislative control, the fact that only Republicans
opposed them suggests again that partisan stances could affect the probability of passing
these anti-takeover statutes.
86

Elsa C. Arnett, Hearing set for today on Norton issue; Ownership of Worcester firm subject of antitakeover
bill, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 9, 1990.
87
Norton Bill, STATE HOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 17, 1990.
88
Joan Vennochi, Antitakeover bill faces tight deadline, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 13, 1990.
89
Id. (noting that there were only 10 members present in the House when bill passed, and no more than 12 in
the Senate).
90
Id.
91
Cleveland, supra note 52.
92
Id. at 233-34
93
Oklahoma House Journal, 2010 Reg. Sess. No. 69 (voting on Senate Bill 1132); Oklahoma Senate Journal,
2010 Reg. Sess. No. 66 (voting on Senate Bill 1132)
94
http://www.oksenate.gov/Senators/Default.aspx?selectedtab=0. Interestingly, the Oklahoma law was
repealed a few years later in what seems to be the only instance where a state repealed an anti-takeover statute.
This repeal passed both Republican-controlled houses in the legislature, but this time, every opposing vote was
a Democrat. Oklahoma State Senate Vote on House bill 1646 (Feb. 26, 2013) (passing the Senate unanimously);
Oklahoma House of Representatives Vote on Bill 1646 House (Feb. 12, 2013) (passing the House 70-24).
95
Matthew G. Dore, The Iowa Business Corporation Act’s Staggered Board Requirement for Public
Corporations: A Hostile Takeover of Iowa Corporate Law?, 60 DRAKE LAW REVIEW DISCOURSE 1, 4-8
(2012).
96
Senate
Journal,
Mar.
7,
2011,
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/SJNL/20110307_SJNL.pdf#page=7 (passing Senate 40-10);
House
Journal,
Mar.
21,
2011,
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/HJNL/20110321_HJNL.pdf#page=9 (passing House 96-2).
97
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/legislators/informationOnLegislators/allLegislators.

20

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/230
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4125863

20

Eldar and Rauterberg:

There are fewer accounts discussing anti-litigation laws. But one that stands out
concerns Nevada’s policy decision, in 2001, to protect officers and directors from personal
liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty by default.98 Although the bill, Senate Bill 577,
ultimately passed both legislative houses with strong bipartisan support, it appears to have
been the result of a series of political compromises. The bill was introduced by Republican
Senator Mark James and backed by Republican governor, Kenny Guinn,99 and was intended
to entice companies to Nevada in exchange for higher franchise fees.100 Proponents claimed
that the liability protections would effectively lure corporations to Nevada because
“[d]irectors are the ones who decide where to incorporate.”101 The higher fees, in turn, were
committed to educational spending to help remedy the deplorable condition of Nevada’s
public schools.102 The bill passed the Republican-controlled Senate103 with only one
(Democratic) vote in opposition,104 but several Democratic senators expressed serious
reservations about the liability protections, and stated that they were only voting for the bill
in order to procure the educational funding, which they were assured would not otherwise
materialize.105 In the Democrat-controlled Assembly,106 several representatives queried
whether the liability protections were actually necessary to increase revenue, 107 and
ultimately revised the bill to strike the liability protections.108 The Senate refused to concur
with the revisions.109 The bill was ultimately referred to a conference committee, from
which it emerged with the liability protections intact.110

98

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 78.138(7). Note that Nevada allowed firms to exempt directors and officers from the
duty of loyalty as early as 1987, but the law required a provision in the articles of incorporations to give effect
to such an exemption. See Barzuza, supra note 55; Eldar, supra note 55.
99
See Minutes for Hearings before S. Jud. Comm. On SB 577, May 22 and 24, 2001,
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/71st2001/Minutes/Senate/JUD/Final/1464.html,
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/71st2001/Minutes/Senate/JUD/Final/1498.html.
100
Minutes
for
Hearings
before
S.
Jud.
Comm.
On
SB
577,
May
22,
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/71st2001/Minutes/Senate/JUD/Final/1464.html.
101
Id.
102
Minutes for Hearings before S. Jud. Comm. On SB 577, May 24, 2001,
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/71st2001/Minutes/Senate/JUD/Final/1498.html.
103
https://ballotpedia.org/Nevada_State_Legislature.
104
Hearing
before
Senate,
May
26,
2001,
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/71st2001/Journal/Senate/Final/sj111.html.
105
See id., Statement of Senator Terry Care (“It is unfortunate [that these provisions] will protect our children,
their welfare, their future, but at the same time, protect some corporate crooks.”); Statement of Senator Dina
Titus (“I have been threatened, and I do not use that term lightly, that if Senate Bill No. 577 does not pass in
this exact form, the so-called education funding package deal falls apart, and there will be no money to pay for
the critical needs of our schools and no money for teacher raises. I cannot let that happen.”).
106
https://ballotpedia.org/Nevada_State_Legislature.
107
See Statement of Chairman Bernie Anderson, id., (“[T]he question was . . . whether public policy should be
put at risk to fund education.”).
108
See
Hearing
before
General
Assembly,
SB
577,
June
3,
2001,
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/71st2001/Journal/Assembly/Final/aj119.html.
109
Hearing
before
Senate,
SB
577,
June
3,
2001,
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/71st2001/Journal/Senate/Final/sj119.html.
110
SB 577 Bill History, https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/71st2001/Journal/Senate/Final/sj119.html. The
final Assembly vote was unanimous. Id.
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Again, this account is broadly consistent with the finding that Republicans are more
amenable to exempting managers from liability. While there was bipartisan support for the
final outcome, presumably in an effort to find funding for Nevada’s schools, the main
proponents of the law were Republicans, and it is clear from the legislative records that many
Democrats were not enthusiastic about the law.
Finally, it appears that the recent trend of states adopting hybrid legal forms, such as
the benefit corporation, appears in many instances, to have been generated by Democrats.
For instance, California attempted to create such a form in 2008, and though it passed both
Democrat-controlled legislative houses,111 it was vetoed by Republican Governor
Schwarzenegger. 112 Three years later, under Democratic Governor Jerry Brown, California
created both the benefit corporation and the flexible purpose corporation.113 Virtually all
opposing votes were Republican.114 Other states significant for their share of out-of-state
incorporations – Delaware and Nevada – also have benefit corporation statutes that were
sponsored almost entirely by Democrats,115 and passed with little opposition in Democratcontrolled legislatures.116 Even among less prominent states for corporate law, the great
111

Assembly Floor Unofficial ballot, AB 2944 (Aug. 31, 2008), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/0708/bill/asm/ab_2901-2950/ab_2944_vote_20080831_0431PM_asm_floor.html; Senate Floor Unofficial
Ballot,
AB
2944
(Aug.
29,
2008),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_29012950/ab_2944_vote_20080829_0441PM_sen_floor.html;
https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_California_state_government.
112
Veto Message, AB 2944 (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_29012950/ab_2944_vt_20080930.html.
113
Assembly
Bill
361
(2011),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_03510400/ab_361_bill_20111009_history.html; Senate Bill 201 (2011), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1112/bill/sen/sb_0201-0250/sb_201_bill_20111009_history.html.
114
See Assembly Floor Vote, AB 361 http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_03510400/ab_361_vote_20110829_0236PM_asm_floor.html; Assembly Judiciary and Appropriations Committee
Votes,
AB
361,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_03510400/ab_361_cfa_20110525_163718_asm_floor.html;
Senate
Floor
Vote,
AB
361,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_03510400/ab_361_vote_20110822_0134PM_sen_floor.html (showing a single democratic vote against); Senate
Banking and Judiciary Committees, AB 361, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_03510400/ab_361_vote_20110822_0134PM_sen_floor.html;
Assembly
Floor
Vote,
SB
201,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_02010250/sb_201_vote_20110830_1003AM_asm_floor.html; Assembly Appropriations and Judicial Committees,
SB
201,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_02010250/sb_201_vote_20110713_000001_asm_comm.html;
Senate
Floor
Vote,
SB
201,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_02010250/sb_201_vote_20110901_1146AM_sen_floor.html; Senate Appropriations, Judiciary and Banking
Committees,
SB
201,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_02010250/sb_201_vote_20110526_000002_sen_comm.html.
115
See Delaware SB 47 (2013), http://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?legislationId=22350 (primary sponsors are
Senator David Sokola (D) and Rep. Byron Short (D)); Nevada AB 89 (2013),
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Reports/history.cfm?ID=259 (sponsored by a group of
legislators consisting of 21 Democrats and four Republicans).
116
See
Senate
Journal
(May
20,
2013),
Nevada
AB
89,
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Journal/Senate/Final/SJ106.pdf (passed Nevada Senate
unanimously);
Assembly
Journal
(March
13,
2013),
Nevada
AB
89,
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majority of benefit corporation statutes in the 36 states that have passed them have been
sponsored by Democrats, or groups of legislators dominated by Democrats.117
In sum, the circumstances giving rise to changes in corporate law are widely varied
and difficult to predict, and different measures may pass regardless of whether legislators
are Democrats or Republicans. Nonetheless, both the regression analysis and the qualitative
evidence from voting records and legislative debates suggest that that legislators’ political
affiliations do inform the adoption of specific laws.
III.

NONPARTISANSHIP AND THE RISE OF DELAWARE

Our evidence suggests that state corporate law can be fraught with partisan politics,
and that partisanship can affect the substance of states’ corporate statutes. But strikingly, the
leader in the market for incorporations takes a nonpartisan approach to corporate law. This
is important because Delaware essentially produces the corporate law and adjudication
governing the substantial majority of large U.S. firms. In this section, we document the rise
of Delaware as the most popular state for incorporations in the late nineteenth century, and
explain the role nonpartisanship played in its ascent. Although our focus is on Delaware, it
is useful to start the discussion by examining the rise and decline of Delaware’s predecessor,
New Jersey. Specifically, we argue that New Jersey lost its leadership in the market for
corporate law because it could no longer credibly commit to insulate corporate law-making
from partisan politics. In capitalizing on the opportunity to commit to nonpartisanship,
Delaware was able to exploit an opportunity to increase its market share for incorporations,
and ultimately overtake New Jersey.

A. New Jersey’s Rise and Fall
New Jersey inaugurated the market for corporate control, or “chartermongering” as
it is sometimes called, in the late decades of the Nineteenth Century.118 Facing significant
state budgetary issues, political and legal entrepreneurs struck upon a novel plan to generate
revenue: attract corporations to domicile in the state by routinizing the incorporation process
and liberalizing the law with the aim of increasing franchise fees and incorporation taxes.119
The plan, whose details we discuss below, was a major success. By the 1900s, franchise

https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Journal/Senate/Final/SJ106.pdf (passed Nevada Assembly
unanimously);
Delaware
General
Assembly,
Senate
Bill
47
Bill
Detail,
http://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?legislationId=22350 (SB 47 passed the Delaware Senate and House with
a single opposing vote).
117
Information on sponsors was taken from the Benefit Corporation website, Benefit Corporation, State-byState Status of Legislation, https://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status?state=0, and sponsors’
party affiliation identified using manual searches. States where benefit corporation legislation has been
sponsored by Republicans are Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah and
Wisconsin.
118
Chartermongering, as the historian Christopher Grandy put it, is the “active solicitation of corporation
charters for the purpose of bolstering state revenues,” and it was invented by New Jersey near the end of the
nineteenth century. Grandy, supra note 20, at 677.
119
Id. at 681.
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taxes and charter fees had gone from a trivial part of state revenue to 60% of state fund
receipts, and New Jersey’s state budget was flush with wealth.120
The success of New Jersey’s plan and its dominance in attracting incorporations
appears to date from several developments. First, in the late 1880s, amid growing antitrust
sentiment across the country, New Jersey amended its corporate code to allow corporations
to own stock in other corporations, allowing large trusts to incorporate and operate as holding
companies.121 Second, beyond the (in)famous trust provisions, New Jersey adopted an
enabling corporation law in 1896 that granted businesses wide freedom of design, including
allowing corporations to be formed for any purpose and providing managers and
shareholders great freedom in structuring their own transactions.122 Third, New Jersey took
a deliberate and aggressive approach to marketing itself as a desirable state of
incorporation.123 Finally, New Jersey judges were appointed by the Governor and ratified
by the legislature, rather than popularly elected or appointed solely by the executive.124
Moreover, since the 1850s, judges were appointed, by custom, on a bipartisan basis, a policy
which was designed to achieve nonpartisanship in adjudication.125
Better known than its rise as a locus of incorporations, however, is New Jersey’s fall
through the early twentieth century.126 It is not entirely clear when New Jersey’s demise
began,127 though it is clear that after the passage the Seven Sister laws in 1913, it largely lost
its appeal as a destination for incorporating.128 These laws essentially repealed New Jersey’s
liberal corporate laws by prohibiting features that made merger waves feasible, including
120

Id. at 683.
Yablon, supra note 20, at 326-27.
122
Id. at 349-350. Note though that New Jersey did retain some mandatory provisions protective of creditors
and shareholders in order not to “scare off potential investors.” Id. at 352.
123
For instance, in 1892, the Corporation Trust Company of New Jersey (“Trust Company”) was formed to
advertise the state’s laws to businesses both in and out-of-state. Id. at 347. The Trust Company had the support
of a network of powerful players in New Jersey politics and included the Governor, Secretary of State, the
Clerk of the Chancery Court, and the State Attorney General as directors. The Trust Company thus underlined
the reliability of New Jersey law, and the responsiveness of New Jersey politicians to the needs of businesses.
Substantively, the Trust Company provided low cost incorporation services to out-of-state businesses. New
Jersey also published a very clear and comprehensive treatise, complete with forms, on its corporate law to
help entice businesses. Id. at 347-353.
124
John B. Wefing, Two Cheers for the Appointment System, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 583, 595-96 (2010) (noting
that although local New Jersey judges were briefly elected, state and county judges have always been appointed
subject to ratification).
125
ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM 32-33 (1955) (“Paradoxical as it may sound, a
bipartisan judiciary is the only way in this country to achieve a nonpartisan judiciary, and who would deny that
all justice should be nonpartisan?”).
126
See Harold W. Stoke, Economic Influences Upon the Corporation Laws of New Jersey, 38 J. POL. ECON.
551, 575-76 (1930); Grandy, supra note 20, at 687; Sarath Sanga, On the Origins of the Market for Corporate
Law (December 13, 2019).
127
Sanga, id., claims that New Jersey’s share of incorporations started declining as early as 1903. However,
Sanga’s account does not provide details on firms’ market capitalizations, and some accounts suggest that the
largest firms continued to be incorporated in New Jersey after 1903. As of 1904, half of Moody’s 318
“industrial trusts,” including the seven largest ones were incorporated in New Jersey. John Moody, The Truth
About Trusts (New York, 1904), pp. 453-69.
128
Stoke, supra note 126; Grandy, supra note 20.
121
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limiting the extent to which corporations could hold stocks in other firms, placing restrictions
on the issuances of stocks, and imposing liability on directors and officers for violations of
these laws.129
The Seven Sister laws emerged from state and national political shifts, particularly
the rise of an aggressive antitrust movement in New Jersey. Antitrust was a key component
of the New Jersey Democrats’ political platform as early as 1901.130 This form of partisan
opposition to New Jersey policy continued to mount through the first decade of the twentieth
century, with leading commentators calling New Jersey the “Traitor State,”131 and local
politicians increasingly espousing reform proposals to tax and regulate corporations.132 This
sentiment was so strong that by 1907, candidates of both parties pledged to impose
restrictions on corporations.133 Thus, when the Democrat elected governor, Woodrow
Wilson, was elected in 1910, some reversal of New Jersey policy may have been a foregone
conclusion. This political sentiment likely triggered New Jersey’s demise even before it was
enshrined in actual legislation.
Relatedly, various demographic changes made New Jersey less dependent on its
ability to attract incorporations. New Jersey’s population grew rapidly from 1.4 to nearly 1.9
million in the 1890s (this is 27 times the growth of Delaware’s population in the same period,
which increased from roughly 168,000 to 185,000).134 New Jersey was also the only state to
more than double its population between 1890 and 1920 that lay east of the Mississippi.135
The growing population coincided with greater industrial development, and engagement in
massive infrastructure construction projects that ultimately could not be provided for by
franchise taxes.136 This expansion likely loosened the corporate hold on New Jersey’s
political system because (1) the state had to account for the interests of its expanding and
increasingly diverse population, and (2) was no longer solely dependent on incorporation
fees and franchise taxes. In fact, multiple authors have pointed to this expansion137 in support
of Roberta Romano’s thesis that smaller states can more credibly commit to responsiveness
to corporate interests.138
That New Jersey had lost its dominance in attracting incorporations at least in part
because of these political energies would have been clear at the time. It thus appears to be
no accident that Delaware took deliberate steps to restrict the influence of political
partisanship on the creation of its corporate law. But before discussing Delaware, it is worth
asking why other states that seemingly competed for incorporations were less successful

129

Grandy, id., at 689; Stoke, id., at 578.
Grandy, id., at 688; Stoke, id., at 577.
131
Lincoln Steffens, New Jersey: A Traitor State, McClure’s Magazine, 25 (May 1905)
132
Grandy, supra note 20, at 686-687.
133
Stoke, supra note 126, at 577.
134
Census, Historical Populations, Table 45. New Jersey - Race and Hispanic Origin: 1790 to 1990,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tabs15-65.pdf.
135
Grandy, supra note 20, at 689.
136
Yablon, supra note 20, at 375-76, Grandy, supra note 20, at 689-90.
137
Id.
138
Roberta Romano, supra note 38, at 231.
130
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than Delaware. Several states, including Maine, Maryland, and New York apparently
competed with New Jersey for incorporations by copying its corporate laws.139
So why didn’t one of these states become an important player in the market for
corporate law? At least in part, the answer seems to be that such states fell short of making
a strict commitment to nonpartisanship and responsiveness to corporate interests. In the
1880s, Maine’s volume of incorporations was similar to New Jersey’s,140 but an 1890
decision by Maine’s Supreme Court holding that shareholders could be personally liable for
certain corporate infractions caused investors to balk, on the basis that incorporation in
Maine was too “dangerous.”141 Maine changed its statute to mimic New Jersey’s and
overruled the decision in 1901, but it remained a “second-rank” chartering state.142 New
York, though a hub for big businesses, was viewed as “mercurial” and less politically reliable
than New Jersey.143 It changed its corporate code in 1901 to better retain in-state businesses,
and appears to have been quite successful in this arena, becoming third in attracting
incorporations that year behind New Jersey and Delaware.144 West Virginia amended its
corporate code in 1901 to offer the “loosest, most liberal law of any state in the union,”
hoping to attract incorporations. This strategy failed, exacerbating an already-existing
reputation for “attracting fakers and swindlers” which scared off legitimate businesses.145
South Dakota also competed for incorporations by offering extremely low franchise fees and
no annual franchise tax,146 but the state quickly developed a reputation for businesses
involved in “shady schemes.”147 Washington D.C. employed a similar strategy with similar
results.148
Notably, none of these jurisdictions mimicked the desirable features of New Jersey’s
courts as thoroughly as Delaware did. The judges in New York, South Dakota, and West
Virginia were popularly elected, likely making them more politically malleable to different
constituencies and more susceptible to the vote-buying and gerrymandering practices that
were rampant throughout the country in the 1890s.149 Maine’s judges were appointed by the
governor and confirmed by a council of legislators, similar to New Jersey’s.150 However, the

139

Grandy, supra note 20, at 685; Stoke, supra note 126, at 575-576. It is not clear however, the extent to
which this strategy was successful in attracting firm incorporations. Although based on Sanga, supra note 126,
New York’s share of incorporations increased around that time, copying New Jersey’s laws does not appear to
have been a successful strategy for other states, such as West Virginia.
140
Id. at 361, n. 226.
141
Id. at 361-62.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 363-364.
144
Id. at 364, n. 250.
145
Id. at 365.
146
Id. at 366. All of the jurisdictions setting out to compete with New Jersey deliberately competed with New
Jersey on price, but South Dakota appears to be the most extreme example.
147
Id.
148
Id. at n. 266.
149
See, e.g., Peter H. Argersinger, New Perspectives on Election Fraud in the Gilded Age, 100 POL. SCI.
QUARTERLY 669 (1985-86).
150
THOMAS NELSON, NELSON’S ENCYCLOPAEDIA: EVERYBODY’S BOOK OF REFERENCE, 537 (1907).

26

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/230
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4125863

26

Eldar and Rauterberg:

1890 decision on personal liability appeared to create a lasting impression that the judiciary
was not reliable, and Maine did not require a bipartisan judiciary.

B. Delaware’s Rise
As noted, in the late 1890s, Delaware copied every one of the features of New
Jersey’s original approach to corporate law. In 1897, it adopted a new constitution that
removed the historical requirement that corporations obtain a charter from the legislature,
and directed the legislature to pass a new, liberalized corporate code. 151 The resulting code,
passed in 1899, was virtually identical to New Jersey’s.152 Corporation trust companies,
similar to New Jersey’s, worked closely with state government officials to market the new
code to businesses, and a treatise, modeled on the New Jersey treatise, was written in the
same year that the new code was passed.153 Moreover, in 1900, the Delaware Court of
Chancery issued a decision committing to interpret issues under its new code in line with
New Jersey precedent in order to assure new corporations that the law would be reliable, and
not subject to any dramatic changes.154
In 1897, even as New Jersey began its decline as the leading site of incorporations,
Delaware went through a major process of constitutional revision.155 This revision, only the
third in its history, had as a centerpiece certain provisions regarding corporate law.156 The
power of the legislature to create individual corporations was removed, and a general
corporation law adopted.157 Article IX requires that any corporate law enjoy support of at
least two-thirds of the legislators elected to each house before it can be enacted.158

151

The Delaware Constitution of 1897: The First 100 Years, ed. Harvey Bernard Rubenstein, 157 (1997).
Yablon, supra note 20, at 359-360. The Delaware code was more promoter-friendly than New Jersey’s in
that it did not require shareholder meetings or original books to be held in Delaware, and incorporation fees
and franchise taxes were 75% and 50% respectively of those in New Jersey. Id. Joel Seligman, A Brief History
of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 J. CORP. L. 249 (1976).
153
Id.
154
Id. at 361. Wilmington City Railway v. People’s Railway, 38 Del. Ch. 1, 21 (1900) (articulating “the
presumption that the legislature, in adopting this language of the New Jersey act, had in mind the construction
given to the adopted language by the New Jersey courts, and intended to incorporate it into the statute”). The
motivation of Delaware was noted by the press at the time. “It is not surprising that Delaware should become
envious of the increasing stream of gold that is pouring into New Jersey’s treasury and take over bodily the
latter’s corporation act-except that where New Jersey’s tax is one-tenth of one percent of all stock outstanding
up to three million, Delaware’s tax is one-twentieth of one per cent up to five million.” McReynolds, WORLD’S
WORK, September, 1904, p. 2528, quoted in Stoke, supra note 126, at 576. See also RUSSELL CARPENTER
LARCOM, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION 14-15 (1937).
155
Delaware’s original constitution was adopted in 1776. Its first major revision was in 1792, its second in
1831, and its third in 1897. PAUL DOLAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELAWARE 75 (1954).
156
Dolan, id., at 75.
157
Dolan, id., at 79-80.
158
Delaware Constitution Article IX Corporations, Section 1 (“No general incorporation law, nor any special
act of incorporation, shall be enacted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members elected to each
House of the General Assembly.”). Dolan, id., at 81. Delaware Constitution Article IX Corporations, Section
1 (“No corporation shall hereafter be created, amended, renewed or revived by special act, but only by or under
general law, nor shall any existing corporate charter be amended, renewed or revived by special act, but only
by or under general law”).
152
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Perhaps even more importantly, Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution created a
partisan balance requirement for the Delaware judiciary. Previously, Delaware judges had
been appointed by the governor without ratification by the legislature, with the result that
the judiciary had been captured by the dominant political party – the Democrats – for the 20
years prior to the 1897 constitution.159 The new constitution added a requirement that the
Superior and Supreme Courts be bipartisan, with no more than a bare majority of judges
(where panels were composed of odd numbers) of either main political party.160
The Framers of the Delaware Constitution were keenly aware of the dynamics of
chartermongering during the debates leading up to the adoption of the Constitution of
1897. In one of the most interesting exchanges, William Saulsbury declared, “I think we
cannot be too careful in inserting in this Constitution any provision which might tend to
restrict or embarrass the corporations acting under the laws of this State,” and that “I believe,
under our general law, in encouraging corporations to take out charters under the laws of our
State, rather than to make that difficult or impossible.”161
Saulsbury specifically praised New Jersey:
The wisdom of this liberality of the laws toward corporations is shown most strongly
in this New Jersey case. I imagine there is no state in the Union that has laws more
favorable to corporations than the State of New Jersey—not only corporations which
do business in the State of New Jersey go to Trenton for charters, but corporations
all over the country are operating under New Jersey charters . . . and they do this
simply because they can get more favorable terms there than elsewhere. The direct
result of this liberal policy of that State has been an increase in the revenues of the
State derived from corporations taxes and franchise fees from $75,000 in 1875, to
$957,000 in 1896.162
Saulsbury was then challenged as to “what good an outside corporation does New
Jersey”?163 Saulsbury replied, “[T]he money it puts into the Treasury. That amount would
be enough to run our State Government, schools and everything else. . . . It simply shows
the result of a liberal policy in one state, as against a narrow, restrictive and hampering policy
in some other state.”164 He then summed up his enthusiasm for Delaware’s entrance into the
chartermongering business:
[I]f corporations can be induced to come to our State to take out their charters and
pay their money into our State Treasury and relieve our people from taxation, instead
of going to New Jersey to get their charters,—I would like to have them come here,
159

See debates and the The Constitution of 1897, supra note 9.
The Constitution of 1897, supra note 151. Note that the Court of Chancery was initially exempt from the
bipartisanship requirement because only a single Chancellor presided. However, appeals of chancery court
decisions went to the Supreme Court, which was subject to the requirement. Moreover, in the 1940s when the
law was modified to allow for the appointment of vice-chancellors, they too were subject to the bipartisanship
requirement. Randy J. Holland, The Delaware State Constitution: A Reference Guide 133 (2002).
161
Constitutional Proceedings at 2135.
162
Id. at 2136.
163
Id.
164
Id.
160
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and have some of this million dollars a year flowing into our State Treasury to run
our schools and State Government, thus relieving our people from excessive
taxation.165
Similar concerns were echoed. One Framer objected to a proposed amendment noting, “I
believe that provision would prevent the organization of corporations under the laws of our
State, and if they wanted to do business here they would go to New Jersey or somewhere
else where they could get charters without these restrictions.”166
It is also clear that many of the Framers wished to adopt a general corporation statute
precisely in order to eliminate the partisan lobbying routinely attendant to the special
incorporation process, which had begun to occupy a major part of the Delaware legislature’s
attention.167 As a member of the Committee on Corporations noted, the “main object” of the
Committee was establishing “in this Constitution provisions which should enable us to
obtain charters without the necessity of going before the Legislature, and, perhaps, in some
cases, securing the assistance and entering upon all those questionable methods of obtaining
legislation.”168 Or as one member of the Committee sharply put it, “It was our intention to
make it so that bodies could not be incorporated, except under a general corporation law. . .
. It will certainly prevent one very great abuse and a very great evil; and that is the lobbying
of wild-cat schemes and corporations through the Legislature.”169 Many of the advocates of
the Committee’s proposed amendments echoed concerns of the Committee about the
demands on the legislature as well,170 including one Framer who noted that “more time of

Id. at 2139. (“If we undertake to go too far, there is danger of driving capital out. Capital goes where it can
invest under the most advantageous terms. Capitalists are not so philanthropic as to invest for the benefit of
communities, unless they can realize some benefit therefrom. If we can be liberal and protect our citizens to
the same extent as they do in New Jersey and make it so that people can come here and get acts of incorporation
and pay for the privilege, through and by which we can replenish our treasury, I do not know but it is a very
good thing to take some little risk; for I think we are going to need some source to draw from.”) (emphasis
added).
166
Id. at 2141.
167
See, e.g., Constitutional Proceedings at 2033 (“People come here with corporation bills, there are large
lobbies employed on both sides of the question, and any amount of time is consumed.”); id. at 2101 (“[W]e
can rely upon the Legislature to frame a proper and wise general corporation law that will protect the interests
of the people of this State and at the same time protect corporate interests; . . . [along with preventing] the
corrupting influences brought to bear upon our Legislature and all that sort of thing, and the great expenditure
of the public money, for no good purpose, consuming the time of the General Assembly.”).
168
Id. at 843.
169
Id. at 2100.
170
Id. at 856 (“You cannot get a charter . . . under the present Constitution, from anybody or from any place
except from the Legislature . . . . It has, therefore, cost an immense increase in the time of this Legislature in
the granting of these charters which ought to have been issued by some properly authorized body . . . . It has
cost months of time and thousands and thousands of dollars under the present method, and it has wasted the
time of the Legislative body to a very great extent in performing this duty. . . . You want a corporate act; you
want a charter; you have got to wait two years for that charter.”).
165
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the Legislature probably is taken with” the process of granting special incorporations “that
than any other subject that is presented to it.”171
Corporate law, strangely enough, was close to the constitutional designer’s hearts.
Indeed, one Framer reflected on the constitutional proceedings, “there has been quite an
express determination here, as regards corporations, to protect them.”172 One newspaper of
the time similarly reflected an awareness of this. It discussed the fact that special
incorporation would be replaced with a general corporate law that would require “much time
and study on the part of the [legislators] . . . , but if modelled after the laws of some of the
other states it will be a great source of revenue to the state.”173
In the century since, Delaware has added other bipartisan features to its approach to
corporate law. Any amendment to the Delaware’s corporate statute is formulated and
proposed by the governing body of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar
Association (the “Council”), a long-standing custom in the Delaware General Assembly.174
The council is comprised of practitioners and expert corporate lawyers from renowned law
firms, with a focus ranging from litigation to transactional counseling to shareholder
plaintiffs.175 Currently, there are 26 members in the Council.176 Corporate law professor and
long-time member of the Council Larry Hamermesh notes that “[a] number of informal
traditions guide the selection of nominees to the Council.177 This process “insulates the
Delaware corporate law from the vagaries of the routine political process and ensures its
continuing vitality and consistency.”178 The State of Delaware’s website goes so far as to
state: “Partisan divides are unheard of, because both political parties understand that trillions
of dollars are invested in these corporations and respect the importance of ensuring that
managers and investors can rely on a statute with real integrity, efficiency, and reliability.”179

Id. at 2033. Id. at 2034 (“[If] the Legislature is also relieved of all that work, it seems to me that it would be
almost impossible for the Legislature to string out its sessions over very many days. EDWARD G.
BRADFORD: It takes away two-thirds of the business.”).
172
Constitutional Proceedings, Vol. 5, at 3328.
173
Changes in the Laws, THE MORNING NEWS (WILMINGTON DELAWARE), July 20, 1897.
174
Hamermesh, supra note 18, at, 1755; Charles M. Elson, Why Delaware Must Retain Its Corporate
Dominance and Why It May Not, UNIV. DELAWARE – JOHN L. WEINBERG CTR. CORP. GOVERNANCE 15 (Mar.
15, 2017).
175
Hamermesh, id., at 1755–56.
176
DELAWARE STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, About the Section of Corporation Law,
https://www.dsba.org/sections-committees/sections-of-the-bar/corporation-law/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
177
Hamermesh, id., at 1756. For the complete and up-to-date by-laws of the Corporate Law Section, follow
http://media.dsba.org/sections/Corporation/CorpLawSectionByLaws2017.pdf.
178
Elson, supra note 174.
179
Delaware.gov, About Delaware’s General Corporation Law, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delawaresgeneral-corporation-law/. See also Stephen Bainbridge, Interest Group Analysis of Delaware Law: The
Corporate Opportunity Doctrine as Case Study, in CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED? EVALUATING
DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW 138 (2018) (arguing that Delaware judges also act to preserve
Delaware’s dominance).
171
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IV.

WHY DOES A NONPARTISAN JURISDICTION WIN?

The historical evidence from early days of the market for corporate law demonstrates
the chilling effect that partisan politics has on the interests of investors. Clearly, the antitrust
movement was detrimental to the interests of business owners, because it constrained their
ability to enter into privately value-maximizing transactions. But even in modern times, our
empirical analysis shows that partisan politics is rarely driven by investors’ interests. As we
show in Section II, party control of the legislature is related to outcomes in corporate lawmaking that generally widen managerial discretion. Although the form of such managerialist
laws appears to differ based on whether the control is in the hands of Democrats or
Republicans,180 both forms of partisan influence lead to a similar outcome in terms of the
allocation of corporate authority between shareholders and management – to greater
managerial discretion and a lower likelihood of questioning corporate decision-making
through shareholder lawsuits.181
Why would partisanship work to potentially curtail shareholders’ rights and increase
managers’ powers? We suggest that the reason for this is that the “shareholder franchise” is
not likely to be vigorously represented by any specific political party. There are several
reasons for this. First, shareholders as a class are a highly diverse group. They range from
unsophisticated retail investors, who still directly hold a nontrivial percentage of equity in
corporations,182 to various diversified index funds that hold a substantial and increasing
share of ownership in a vast cross-section of public companies,183 to a variety of other
intermediaries, including hedge fund activists,184 actively managed mutual funds, and more.
Shareholders thus encompass a vast heterogeneity of styles, holding horizons, and portfolios.
Thus, their interests and corporate governance philosophies can differ substantially, with
some favoring companies pursuing short-term interests, and others preferring long-term
corporate value propositions and sustainability objectives.185 These shareholders do not and
180

As shown in Section II, Democratic control is associated with anti-takeover and pro-stakeholder statutes,
while Republican controlled legislatures seem to favor certain statutes that restrict the litigation liability of
corporate managers.
181
Of course, it may be the case that that laws that increase managerial discretion indirectly benefit shareholder
value. We do not address this issue in this paper.
182
Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, The Economics of Intermediaries, in SECURITIES MARKET
ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten, Edward F. Greene & Manesh S. Patel
eds.) (2018).
183
Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493 (2018).
184
Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, Recent Advances in Research on Hedge Fund Activism: Value
Creation and Identification, 7 ANNUAL REV. FIN. ECON. 579 (2015).
185
Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 771 (2017). It may be the case that many
shareholders come from the wealthier echelons of society. See Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions,
No. 2016-06 The Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance Discussion Paper (2016) (noting in
particular that investors in mutual funds, which comprise the majority of stock ownership, tend to be wealthier).
Nonetheless, these investors increasingly hold socially progressive views. See id. at 16 (noting that the majority
of mutual fund investors favor resolutions requiring disclosure of campaign contributions); Michal Barzuza,
Quinn Curtis, and David H.Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial
Corporate Governance (August 19, 2019). 93 Southern California Law Review (Forthcoming 2020), Available
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439516 (arguing that index funds increasingly vote aggressively on social
issues to win business from socially conscious millennial investors).
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cannot have a clear party affiliation, nationally, let alone at the state level, and they will
rarely interact as a unified constituency with state politicians. In contrast, other corporate
constituencies will often have a very strong state-level presence. Thus, partisanship presents
a risk that shareholders’ interests will be compromised in favor of another constituency
Second, shareholders, tend to be located in different geographic jurisdictions. They
are unlikely to be a locally powerful constituency. Increasingly, most public equity is owned
by large institutional fund families. BlackRock alone has more than $6 trillion in assets under
management and is the largest shareholder in a significant percentage of U.S.
corporations.186 Vanguard, too, has $5 trillion in assets and holds a diversified portfolio of
public equity. The ultimate investors in these funds are located throughout the U.S. (and
even globally). Thus, in any given state, at any given point, they are likely to be politically
weak in comparison to geographically concentrated local actors. Finally, investors tend to
be diversified and invest in firms located in multiple jurisdictions. Their stake in lobbying
for legislation in each state, particularly states where few firms are incorporated, is likely to
be low.
A recent example that illustrates the weakness of shareholders in partisan politics
involves the infamous activist investor, Carl Icahn, lobbying for the overhaul of North
Dakota corporate law code in 2008. The law, which was intended to brand North Dakota
firms as “shareholder-friendly,” was passed by a Republican-controlled legislature and
approved by a Republican Governor.187 The resulting law includes a prohibition on
staggered boards, mandatory majority voting in the election of directors, and limitations on
the adoption of poison pills and shareholder access to the proxy.188 The intent behind this
measure was to establish a “brand” by which North Dakota companies would be immediately
recognized as shareholder-friendly.189 Despite the legislative efforts, as of 2013 only two
public companies incorporated in North Dakota (one owned by Carl Icahn), and twelve
shareholder proposals sponsored by activist investors to reincorporate firms in North Dakota
have failed to gain shareholder support.190
186

Martin C. Schmalz, Common-Ownership Concentration and Corporate Conduct, 10 ANNUAL REV. FIN.
ECON. 413, 417 (2018).
187
Although there was a ragbag of votes for and against, the majority of votes against the measure were
democrat. https://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/60-2007/journals/sr63.pdf#Page1265 (passing Senate 42-5,
with two democrats and three Republicans voting against, and 19 Democrats and 23 Republicans in favor);
https://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/60-2007/journals/hr30.pdf#Page594 (passing House 63-31, with 22
democrats and nine Republicans against, and 12 Democrats and 51 Republicans in favor).
188
William H. Clark, Jr. and Amber A. Hough, A New Paradigm for State Corporation Laws, 84 N.D. L. REV.
1059 (2008).
189
Id.; see also Statement of Bill Clark, Hearing on HB 1340 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 60th N.D.
Legis. Sess. (Jan. 24, 2007) at 2, https://www.legis.nd.gov/files/resource/60-2007/library/hb1340.pdf.
Proponents of the bill promoted it as a measure with no downside (since companies would opt in) that would
“tell the rest of the country and beyond the country that North Dakota believes in a business model that
encourages shareholder involvement and support.” Statement of Rick Berg (Republican), House Majority
Leader Id., at 1.
190
Liz Hoffman, Icahn Likes North Dakota for Shareholders, but State Fails to Draw Public Companies, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2013). See also Stephen Bainbridge, Why the North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act
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There may be many salient reasons why North Dakota failed to compete with
Delaware, such as its lack of corporate law expertise, geographic distance from major
business and legal hubs, or the objections of corporate managers to the reincorporations. But
the widespread failure of shareholder proposals to reincorporate in North Dakota also
suggests that not all shareholders want laws that promote maximum shareholder activism,
and some may prefer managers to have some latitude in decision-making. At least in part,
the role of managers is to resolve conflicts of interest among diverse types of shareholders,
whose interests may not be aligned with those of activists.191 A partisan commitment to
promote the interests of hedge funds might not appeal to all classes of shareholders (as well
as managers), and thereby may fail to attract firms with diverse public shareholdings.192
Accordingly, the general failure of investors to jump on Icahn’s bandwagon with respect to
North Dakota reinforces our argument that shareholders are heterogenous in their
governance preferences.193 A nonpartisan jurisdiction, such as Delaware, can make a
stronger commitment to adopt laws that balance the interests of different types of
shareholders (as well as managers) and to attempt, albeit imperfectly, to maximize value for
all shareholders.
But if managers are often the main decision-makers in corporations, why would they
seek to escape the impact of political partisanship by incorporating in Delaware? After all,
if political partisanship works to benefit managers, managers might view it as advantageous.
The extent to which managerial incentives shape incorporation decisions is the subject of a
long-standing and much re-hashed debate regarding the desirability of regulatory
competition. Critiques of the internal affairs doctrine have argued that incorporations are to
a large extent driven by managerial interests,194 and thus, firms prefer to incorporate in states
that have laws that are more favorable to managers. Conversely, others have argued that in
competitive capital markets, firms must choose to incorporate in jurisdictions that provide
optimal protection for shareholders, or they will be able to raise less capital. 195 For our
purposes, we do not need to decide between these competing viewpoints or to quantify the
extent to which agency costs affect incorporation decisions (if at all).
What matters for our purposes is that shareholders’ interests have at least some
meaningful influence on firms’ incorporation choices. Even if agency costs exist in many
corporations, it seems unlikely that managers, who mostly get equity compensation, would
have incentives to incorporate in a state that systematically neglects shareholders’ interests.
In fact, empirical evidence shows that states that adopted anti-takeover statutes have lost
Will Fail, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1043 (predicting that North Dakota’s shareholder-friendly corporate law would not
attract incorporations away from Delaware).
191
Goshen & Squire, supra note 185 (discussing costs arising from disagreements among shareholders).
192
Critics of the North Dakota bill worried that it would put “another tool in the belt of activist shareholders,
or greenmailers.” Statement of Stacey Dahl (Republican) at 19, Hearing on HB 1340 Before the H. Comm. on
the Appropriations, 60th N.D. Legis. Sess. (Feb. 9, 2007), https://www.legis.nd.gov/files/resource/602007/library/hb1340.pdf.
193
Had enough large investors shared Icahn’s vision, it seems plausible that they could have devoted
sufficient resources, acting together, to bolster North Dakota’s corporate judiciary sufficiently to make it
competitive with Delaware’s.
194
Cary, supra note 36; Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 50.
195
Winter, supra note 36; ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
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rather than gained market share of firm incorporations.196 Moreover, the composition of the
shareholder franchise has changed in the last century from dispersed shareholders who hold
shares in individual accounts to savvy institutions who hold more than seventy percent of
public corporations.197 These institutions have shown substantial influence in tilting the
balance of power against managers in several contexts, including poison pills,198 staggered
boards199 and majority voting,200 and there is evidence that they have a material impact on
incorporation decisions.201 While managers, if left to their own devices, might prefer to
incorporate in jurisdictions with highly pro-managerial laws, pressure from powerful
institutional investors and organized proxy advisory firms makes this strategy difficult to
implement.202
Accordingly, we claim that market-oriented firms are likely to resist incorporating in
states where corporate law-making and adjudication are highly partisan. The reason is that
these states may be more likely to adopt laws that compromise shareholder rights to benefit
other stakeholders. Such laws may result in greater uncertainty for investors, and higher risk
that managers will have excessive discretion in running corporations. Of course, even a
nonpartisan state would likely address the interests of managers and local stakeholders
because they influence local interests and politics.203 The key point is that a nonpartisan
process in corporate law makes that law less likely to be biased against shareholders’
rights.204

196

Eldar & Magnolfi, supra note 47.
Matthew Backus, Christopher Conlon, & Michael Sinkinson, Common Ownership in America: 1980-2017
(Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. w25454, 2019).
198
Emiliano M. Catan, The Insignificance of Clear-Day Poison Pills, 48 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2019).
199
Martijn Cremers & Simone Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67
(2016).
200
Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan, & Edward B. Rock, Does Majority Voting Improve Board
Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119 (2016).
201
Eldar & Magnolfi, supra note 47.
202
For a telling example, see Steven Davidoff Solomon, Abercombie’s Ohio Express, N.Y. TIMES., Dec. 23
2010 (describing Abercombie & Fitch’s failed attempt to reincorporate from Delaware to Ohio in order to
benefit from Ohio’s anti-takeover statutes).
203
The example of Delaware’s business combination statute is complex, but the recollections of attorneys
present in the 1980s suggest its principal motivation was to provide a balanced statute that nonetheless
addressed takeovers in the wake of other states’ action on the subject. Gil Sparks, then Chairman of the
Delaware Corporation Law Section, recalled that “with 27 other states . . . having passed some form of
antitakeover legislation, that . . . competitively, it was appropriate for Delaware to do something. And I think
the sense of the bar was . . . we ought to try to be a leader here and come up with something that is acceptable
to all constituencies. That we . . . had enough of a – sort of an economic lead in this area that we could afford
to be trendsetters and try to come up with something that . . . was as balanced as it could possibly be.” Transcript
of Interview with Gil Sparks at 9-10, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/7006-section-203-of-thedelaware-general-corporation. See also Section II.D.
204
There may also be an argument that nonpartisanship promotes stability, which makes it easier to do
business. See Feinstein, Brian D. and Meng, Chen and Padi, Manisha, Polarized State Politics, Stable
Mortgage Markets (2019). U.Chi. Research Paper No. 882, available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3385963 (noting that political uncertainty may decrease economic activity);
197
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But why would any state commit to a nonpartisan process? The reason is to attract
incorporations. As described above, Delaware commits to create a legal system that is
attentive to corporate interests.205 That is, Delaware commits to be responsive to demandside interests in order to maintain its leadership in the market for incorporations. Delaware’s
commitment is particularly credible due to the state’s fiscal dependence on revenue from
franchise taxes.206 We believe that within this framework, nonpartisanship is another
important, albeit overlooked, element in Delaware’s strategy to commit to corporate
interests. Nonpartisanship signals to investors that their interests will not be unpredictably
harmed to benefit a local constituency.207 Thus, corporations’ ability to raise capital and run
their business efficiently will remain intact.208
Moreover, nonpartisanship is tightly linked to the notion of fostering technical
expertise. As every scholar of corporate law knows, corporate law is a technically demanding
body of law that requires expertise to understand the potential effects of an intervention on
the functioning and success of corporations. One of the main rationales for nonpartisanship
is the promotion of expertise over interest-group politics. Partisanship could mean that a
state may make a decision that promotes the interest of one isolated group without regard to
the broader impact on the functioning of capital markets and the economy at large. To create
an effective corporate law system, law makers and judges must carefully balance the
interests of managers, different types of investors, and possibly other stakeholders. They also

Candace Jens, Political Uncertainty and Investment: Causal Evidence from U.S. Gubernatorial Elections
(January 20, 2016), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2176855
(political uncertainty can lower investment); Gönül Çolak, Art Durnev & Yiming Qian, Political
Uncertainty and IPO Activity: Evidence from U.S. Gubernatorial Elections, 52 J. OF FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 2523–2564 (2017) (political uncertainty may diminish IPO activity). While it is possible that this
may contribute to Delaware’s popularity, we note that Delaware’s corporate law is largely judge-made, and
therefore potentially subject to frequent or unexpected changes.
205
See Romano, supra note 38.
206
Id.
207
Note that we do not claim here that Delaware is committed to maximum investor protection, but only that
nonpartisanship is part of a strategy to that commits to creating corporate laws consistent with corporations’
ability to raise capital. Thus, this claim is consistent with (a) views that most states have limited incentives to
vigorously compete with Delaware for incorporations, see, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 36, at 56163; Kahan & Kamar, supra note 35; (b) views that Delaware is too deferential to managers and should give
greater protections to shareholders, see, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, & Robert J. Jackson Jr., Toward a
Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (2014); and (c) the view that greater
investor protection is not actually conducive to shareholder value, see, e.g., Cain et al., supra note 47; K.J.
Martijn Cremers, Scott B. Guernsey, Lubomir P. Litov, & Simone M. Sepe, Shadow Pills and Long-Term Firm
Value (European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper, 2018).
208
Ron Gilson, Henry Hansmann, and Mariana Pargendler make a related observation that the U.S. system of
corporate law—in which half of public corporations charter in their headquarters state, half incorporate in
Delaware, and few other states attract out-of-state incorporations—can be understood as a system of
“regulatory dualism.” In this system, companies with managers or controlling shareholders who want to protect
their interests using local political influence interests incorporate in their headquarters state, while companies
controlled by parties interested in maximizing market value incorporate in Delaware, “whose law offers (at
least modestly) greater shareholder protection and overall efficiency than do the laws of other states.” See
Gilson, Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, supra note 28, at 512-13.
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need to continuously adapt the law to the ever-changing landscape of business transactions
and corporate enterprise.
For many years, the Delaware Chancery Court has been viewed as the epitome of
corporate law expertise.209 Delaware judges are known for their business savvy and ability
to engage with empirical studies that evaluate the consequences of different types of legal
regimes. Many Delaware judges engage in scholarly writing and teach corporate law in
leading law schools in the United States. Although some states have tried to emulate
Delaware by creating specialized business courts,210 no state has been able to come close to
Delaware’s reputation. When Delaware made a firm commitment in 1897 to a bipartisan
judiciary, and thus nonpartisan adjudication, other states that competed for incorporations
failed to do so. This enduring commitment likely facilitated the evolution of judicial
expertise in corporate law that forms part of the Delaware product to date.
Finally, we note that there is no guarantee that any state with a commitment to
nonpartisan corporate law will emerge. As noted, New Jersey, Delaware’s predecessor in
the 19th century, lost its status as the leader for firm incorporations largely due to political
intervention in its corporate law-making that culminated in the revision of its corporate code
to the detriment of corporate interests.211 Unlike New Jersey, which experienced major
population growth in the late 19th century, Delaware is uniquely suited to adopt a nonpartisan
process for corporate law-making. It is one of the least populous states in the U.S. with no
major local manufacturing or agricultural industry that generates substantial revenues. In
fact, its main source of revenue is franchise fees from firm incorporations. Thus, if
Delaware’s demographics changed, there is no guarantee that another state would take its
place.
V.

A NOTE ON THE POLITICAL LEGITIMACY OF NONPARTISAN CORPORATE LAW

Delaware’s nonpartisan corporate law raises concerns about legitimacy. Should one
state define the law governing large corporations that affect individuals in all states, when
that state answers only to itself? And this problem is only sharpened if we appreciate (1) that
a measure of Delaware’s success lies in insulating its corporate law even from its own
ordinary politics, and (2) that this success is due to a regulatory system in which the
provision of insulated corporate law will be favored by out-of-state corporations. Should we
worry all the more if the state that provides corporate law to national companies will be a
state that tries to cordon that law off from ordinary politics?

209

See, e.g., Hamermesh, supra note 18; Fisch, supra note 39; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New
Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 146 (2001); Brett H. McDonnell,
Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP. L. 99, 106 (2004); Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann,
Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2008).
210
Jens Dammann, Business Courts and Firm Performance. U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper
564 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2889898.
211
As discussed above, Delaware then seized the opportunity to enshrine the partisan balance in its judiciary
in its state constitution.
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A literature of its own explores the political legitimacy of Delaware, and we cannot
hope to do it justice or decisively answer this question.212 Instead, we draw on that
literature’s insights to show that the problem, while real, has a broader political and
institutional context that must be appreciated before reasonable judgments about Delaware’s
legitimacy can be made. First, as Mark Roe has famously observed, corporate law is made
in Delaware, but also in Washington, D.C.213 The federal government can and does adopt
laws altering the governance of public corporations, particularly during times of crisis. The
fact that the federal government intervenes, and could federalize corporate governance
entirely, arguably means that it “permits” Delaware’s outsized success.214 In principle, the
federal government could eliminate it. Nonetheless, Roe and others have made two
additional points about federal involvement in corporate governance. One is to catalog the
many limitations on federal lawmaking, which prevent the federal government from acting
as an optimal overseer of state competition.215 Because of all the frictions associated with
federal statutory law, the fact that federal corporate law could displace Delaware simply does
not assure the merits of the Delaware experiment or signal that the federal government
“approves” of it or any specific law. The other point is that there is no guarantee that the
federal government would produce corporate law more reflective of popular sentiment (or
more effective at governing companies) than Delaware law. In fact, the federal government
could be more prone to capture by lobbyists and interest groups than Delaware.216
Another key institutional feature is that Delaware’s legislators and judges appreciate
its legitimacy problem, and seek to secure the state’s legitimacy through decisions of broad
appeal and by avoiding intervention on issues of truly national import. As Marcel Kahan and
Edward Rock note, while Congress, federal agencies, and even other states reacted
aggressively to the frauds at Enron or WorldCom, Delaware’s legislators and agencies did
nothing, recognizing the state’s “lack of political legitimacy” on national issues.217
Delaware’s judges are similarly attuned to broader social currents, and Delaware’s law is
sufficiently flexible to allow its judges to mold it for changing times.218 The most recent
example might be their effort to nod toward corporate social responsibility in a series of
212

See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and Corporate Law: The Case for Regulatory Redundancy, 86 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1272 (2009) (arguing that while state corporate law suffers from a legitimacy deficit, federal
involvement mitigates it and should be granted greater judicial deference); Kent Greenfield, Law, Politics, and
the Erosion of Legitimacy in the Delaware Courts, 55 N.Y. L. SCHOOL L. REV. 481 (2011) (arguing that the
Delaware judiciary’s departures from traditional legal analysis undermine its legitimacy); CHRISTOPHER M.
BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
SHAREHOLDER POWER 276-78 (2013) (discussing the debate as to Delaware’s political legitimacy).
213
Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2009).
214
See, e.g., Roe, supra note 12, at 588 (“[T]hat which persists in Delaware is that which the federal authorities
tolerate”); Jones, supra note 212.
215
In particular, Roberta Romano has been a vigorous and insightful critic of the federal government’s forays
into crisis-inspired corporate governance mandates. See Romano, Quack Corporate Governance, supra note
36; see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 270 (2012).
216
See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE
L.J. 2359 (1998); Kahan & Rock, supra note 12; Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2493
(2005).
217
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 12.
218
Fisch, supra note 39.
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recent Caremark opinions refusing to dismiss suits against directors based on their failure to
prevent corporate wrongdoing.219 Claims based on Caremark oversight duties have been
summarily dismissed for two decades, but the Delaware Chancery Court now seems willing
to entertain claims to enforce compliance obligations that go to broader concerns of
sustainability and governance.220
In this paper, we can only gesture at the issue of Delaware’s broader political
legitimacy. We note that Delaware makes law in a complex institutional context including
not only the other states but the federal government and global actors. Appreciating this by
no means settles the score, however. We hope our project clarifies the stakes.
VI.

THE THREAT TO DELAWARE’S NONPARTISANSHIP IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT

Our analysis of the partisanship of many states and the nonpartisanship of Delaware
opens up a broader discussion about the relationship between partisan politics and corporate
law. While we find partisanship to be linked to differences in the laws of many states, and
nonpartisanship to be part of Delaware’s attraction, this feature was recently under threat in
litigation in the Supreme Court. In this section, we discuss the litigation, the implications of
its outcome, and how our analysis may inform future decisions.
The recent litigation in Carney v. Adams,221 threatened a prominent piece of
Delaware’s nonpartisan approach, namely the bipartisanship of its judiciary. As discussed
above, Delaware’s expert judiciary is an important competitive advantage. The provisions
creating partisan balance are widely viewed as a key element in ensuring that adjudication
of corporate disputes is guided by judges’ expertise, rather than political ideology. The
Delaware judiciary’s bipartisan balance consists of two parts. The first is the requirement
that no more than a bare majority of the judges in Delaware’s Supreme Court, Court of
Chancery, and Superior Court belong to any political party (the “bare majority”
requirement).222 The 1897 Constitutional Convention that adopted this requirement was
acutely aware that “. . . there was already at that time ‘too much politics’ in the courts and
that the election of judges would merely contribute to that unsatisfactory situation.”223 In
1951, Delaware finalized the character of its partisan balance requirement by adopting the
second component, which mandates that the minority of judges on Delaware’s Supreme

219

See, e.g., In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 2017-0222-JRS (consol.), memo. op.
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (addressing alleged failure to monitor for FDA violations).; Jack L. Marchand, II v.
John W. Barnhill, Jr., et al. and Blue Bell Creameries USA, Inc., No. 533, 2018, opinion (Del. June 18, 2019;
rev. June 19, 2019) (addressing allegations of failure to monitor for health and safety compliance).
220
Martin Lipton, Daniel A. Neff, and Andrew R. Brownstein, Risk Management and the Board of Directors,
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, November 20, 2019, at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/20/riskmanagement-and-the-board-of-directors-7/ .
221
Adams v. Governor of Delaware, 922 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 2019).
222
The Constitution of 1897, supra note 151. Note that the Court of Chancery was initially exempt from the
bipartisanship requirement; see supra note 160.
223
No Elective Judges, MORNING NEWS, Feb. 10, 1897, at 1, 3, quoted by Friedlander, supra note 32, at 114849.
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Court, Court of Chancery, and Superior Court all belong to the “other major party” and only
to that party (the “two-party” requirement).224
The State of Delaware was sued on the ground that disqualifying individuals who are
not Democrats or Republicans from serving on any of these three Delaware high courts
violates the First Amendment of the federal constitution. In Carney v. Adams,225 the Third
Circuit affirmed the lower court ruling that the partisan balance provisions of Delaware’s
Constitution were invalid because the two-party majority requirement conditions
appointment on a judicial candidate’s political affiliation.226 The case was appealed to the
Supreme Court. In its December 2020 opinion, the Court avoided entirely any substantive
analysis of the provisions, holding instead that the challenger lacked standing.227 In a brief
concurrence, however, Justice Sotomayor cautioned that while she agreed with the Court’s
standing analysis, “the constitutional issues in this case will likely be raised again.”228
Our analysis can inform future consideration of the constitutionality of Delaware’s
bipartisan balance requirement. We focus here on the two-party provision, which “arguably
impose[s] a greater burden on First Amendment associational rights,”229 and is therefore
likely to be more problematic from a constitutional perspective. Subject to constitutional
constraints, each state has the power to determine qualifications for its judges.230 Delaware’s
requirement that its judges belong to one of the two main political parties arguably impinges
on the First Amendment because it “limits a judicial candidate’s freedom to associate (or not
to associate) with the political party of his or her choice.”231 If the two-party requirement
does indeed restrict First Amendment rights, it must satisfy the strict scrutiny standard. To
meet that standard, the two-party requirement must “further some vital governmental end by
a means that is the least restrictive of freedom of belief and association in achieving that end,
and the benefit gained must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected rights.”232 We
make three points. First, strict scrutiny may not be the correct standard under which to
examine the two-party requirement. Second, even if strict scrutiny applies, the provision may
plausibly further a “vital government end” by the “least restrictive means” available. Third,
because the bipartisanship requirements reflect a deliberate choice by Delaware as to its
constitutional structure and the qualifications of its judges, restraint should be exercised in
interpreting the First Amendment in a way that disrupts them.

224

Henry R. Horsey & William Duffy, The Supreme Court After 1951: The Separate Supreme Court, DEL.
COURTS, http://courts.delaware.gov/supreme/history/history3.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
225
See supra note 209.
226
The Third Circuit held that the bare majority provision is not severable from the two-party provision,
Adams, supra note 221, at 183.
227
Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493 (2020).
228
Id. at 503 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
229
Id. (noting that the bare majority and the two-party requirements are materially different, and “may
require distinct constitutional analysis.”).
230
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (holding that there is no violation of the equal protection
clause for not extending mandatory retirement age in the public sector to state judges).
231
Adams, supra note 221, at 169.
232
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), at 363, 96 S.Ct. 2673.
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First, a provision restricting the political affiliation of a government office-holder
may avoid strict scrutiny if the position is that of a “policymaker.”233 Whether an employee
is a policymaker turns on “whether the employee acts as an adviser or formulates plans for
the implementation of broad goals.”234 The Third Circuit held that “the policymaking
exception does not apply to members of the judicial branch because judicial decisions do not
reflect the political will and partisan goals of the party in power.235 Other circuits, however,
have found that judges occupy policymaking positions for which disqualification on the
basis of political party is appropriate,236 on the ground that “[a] judge both makes and
implements governmental policy.”237 Delaware’s bipartisanship requirement reflects the
realistic role that Delaware’s Framers expected judges to play in promulgating policy. Those
expectations were born out – the Chancery Court’s decisions affect corporate policy across
the country. Studies routinely show that Delaware judicial decisions affect how major
business transactions are conducted,238 and it is widely appreciated that Delaware corporate
law is mostly judge-made.239 The idea that Delaware chancellors do not “make and
implement government policy” would seem unrealistic to most students of corporate law.
Accordingly, there is at the very least a colorable argument that Delaware’s judges qualify
as “policymakers,” obviating the need for strict scrutiny of the provision.
Second, even if the two-party requirement does not satisfy the policymaking
exception, there are reasons to argue that it is necessary to achieve Delaware’s interests under
the strict scrutiny standard. To survive strict scrutiny, the government interest in the
provision must be “paramount, one of vital importance.”240 The professionalism of
Delaware’s judiciary and its commitment to protecting investors is crucial to Delaware’s
ability to remain the leading jurisdiction for corporate law. As we argue in this article,
nonpartisanship is a critical element of the Delaware “product.” Empirical studies suggest

233

Elrod, id. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). A less demanding view
of this exception to the strict scrutiny standard requires only that political affiliation may be an appropriate
qualification (Branti, id. at 518). Given that most judges are appointed based on political affiliation, this
requirement seems to be easily satisfied.
234
Elrod, id. at 368.
235
Adams, supra note 221, at 179-181,
236
See Newman v. Voinovich, 986 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that the governor is “free to make
judicial appointments based on political considerations.”); Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 770 (7th Cir.
1988) (“A judge may be suspicious of the police or sympathetic to them, stern or lenient in sentencing, and
political debates rage about such questions. In most states judges are elected, implying that the office has a
political component. Holders of the appointing authority may seek to ensure that judges agree with them on
important jurisprudential questions.”). But see Adams v. Carney, at 179-181 (holding that that judges cannot
be viewed as policymakers because their decisions relate to cases under review and not to partisan political
interests).
237
Kurowski, supra note 236 at 770.
238
See e.g., Cain, Matthew D. and Griffith, Sean J. and Jackson, Jr., Robert J. and Davidoff Solomon, Steven,
Does Revlon Matter? An Empirical and Theoretical Study (February 1, 2020). European Corporate Governance
Institute - Law Working Paper No. 466/2019, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3418499 (finding
that deals governed by Delaware’s Revlon doctrine are more intensely negotiated, involve more bidders and
result in higher transactions than other deals not governed by Delaware law).
239
Fisch, supra note 39; Hamermesh, supra note 18.
240
Elrod, supra note 232 at 362.
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that political diversity on judicial panels produces less polarized decisions,241 and polarized
decisions could hamper the predictability and expertise characteristic of the Delaware
judiciary. Accordingly, it is plausible that a bipartisan judiciary is a vital interest of
Delaware.242
Relatedly, although the Third Circuit held that the two-party provision could not
survive strict scrutiny because it was not sufficiently “narrowly tailored,” it is possible that
the provision might be the least restrictive means available to preserve Delaware’s interest
in judicial balance. Delaware currently requires appointees to belong to one of the two major
parties, and the Third Circuit found that the bare majority requirement was not severable
from the two-party requirement.243 But if it were decided that the two requirements are
severable, Delaware could retain the bare majority requirement, but allow appointees from
outside the two main parties. However, it would be possible to manipulate such a system by
appointing nominal independents who are committed to particular political causes. 244 The
petitioner in Adams v. Carney identifies as a “Bernie Sanders supporter.”245 Similarly, rightleaning “independents” might also be used to stack the courts, even if the bare majority
provision survives. While there may be other means that Delaware could explore to maintain
the nonpartisanship of the law its judiciary produces, these are unproven, and the stakes are
high. Bipartisanship has played a central role in enhancing the expertise and reputation of
Delaware’s judiciary, and the economic stakes involved in its decisions.246 Accordingly, the
preservation of that bipartisanship might outweigh the First Amendment restrictions of the
two-party provision.
Even if the bare majority provision is, on its own, susceptible to manipulation, it is
nonetheless better than nothing at all, and the Court should find that it is severable from the
two-party provision. A provision is severable if (1) it is capable of standing alone, and (2) it
241

Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 103 (2000); Brian
Feinstein and Daniel Hemel, Partisan Balance with Bite, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 75-78 (2018); Thomas J.
Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 823, 852 (2006).
242
Brief for the Delaware State Bar Association as Amicus Curiae, Jan. 28 2020, available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-309/130178/20200128140258521_19309tsacTheDelawareStateBarAssociation.PDF (last visited July 12, 2020) (citing Elrod and Branti, supra note
233).
243
Adams, supra note 221, at 183.
244
Brief of Amicus Curiae Professors Brian D. Fenstein and Daniel J. Hemel in Support of Petitioner at 6,
available
at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-309/130152/20200128124557751_19309%20tsac%20Profs.%20Feinstein%20and%20Hemel.pdf (last visited July 12, 2020).
245
Third Circuit at 172. In oral argument, the lawyer representing Delaware observed that the respondent
“made the point [that Delaware courts could be stacked with nominal independents without the two-party
provision]. ‘If there were already a Democratic majority on the court and the governor were able to name [the
petitioner], it would just fly in the face and frustrate the purpose of the political balance provision.’” Jess
Bravin, Supreme Court Opens Term with Case on Partisanship of Judges in Delaware, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5,
2020).
246
Brief For Amici Curiae Professors In Support Of Petitioner, Carney v. Adams, Jan. 27 2020, available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-309/130034/20200127153858238_19309%20Carney%20v%20Adams%20Amici%20Curiae%20Professors%20in%20Support%20of%20Petitione
r.pdf (last visited February 15, 2020).
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is not clear that the legislature “would have preferred no statute at all.”247 The Third Circuit
itself acknowledged that the bare majority requirement is perfectly capable of standing alone,
and actually does in the sections of the Delaware constitution involving Family Court and
the Court of Common Pleas.248 Yet, the court invalidated the provision on the ground that it
was toothless without the two-party requirement.249 There is no evidence that the Framers
would have preferred both provisions to be invalidated. In fact, the bare majority requirement
was the only bulwark against partisanship in the Delaware courts from 1897 until 1951,
when the two-party requirement was adopted.250 These facts suggest, as Justice Sotomayor
implied in her concurrence, that the Third Circuit may not have been the correct court to
decide such a “sensitive issue of state constitutional law,” which should instead be certified
to the Delaware Supreme Court.251
Finally, because the bipartisan requirements reflect a deliberate decision by
Delaware about its constitutional structure and the qualifications of its judges, courts should
be hesitant to interpret the First Amendment in a way that invalidates them.252 Judicial
“scrutiny will not be so demanding [when dealing] with matters resting firmly within a
State’s constitutional prerogatives.”253 Accordingly, a court’s First Amendment review of
Delaware’s bipartisan requirements should be “less exacting.”254 The right to establish
qualifications for its judges is “fundamental” to Delaware’s sovereignty,255 and Delaware
has made use of this right to create an exceptional judiciary.256 Future courts should think
twice before undoing the provisions that contributed to that achievement.

247

Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25, 37 (2014). The burden is on the party arguing that
the provisions are not severable. Reese v. Hartnett, 73 A.2d 782, 784 (Del. Super. Ct.).
248
Adams, supra note 221, at 183-184.
249
Id.
250
Brief for the Petitioner at 52, Carney v. Adams, Jan. 2020, available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-309/132933/20200213123011467_19309%20ts%20reprint.pdf.
251
See Carney v. Adams, supra note 227 at 504 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
252
See id. (noting that certification to the state’s highest court “may be especially warranted in a case such as
this, where invalidating a state constitutional provision would affect the structure of one of the State’s three
major branches of government.”).
253
Gregory, supra note 230, at 463.
254
Id.
255
Id. at 460 (“The present case concerns a state constitutional provision through which the people of
Missouri establish a qualification for those who sit as their judges. This provision goes beyond an area
traditionally regulated by the States; it is a decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity.”)
256
See Brief For Amici Curiae Professors In Support Of Petitioner, Carney v. Adams, Jan. 27 2020, available
at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-309/130034/20200127153858238_19309%20Carney%20v%20Adams%20Amici%20Curiae%20Professors%20in%20Support%20of%20Petitione
r.pdf (last visited February 15, 2020) (“The Delaware experiment has been a triumphant success”); Brief For
Amici Curiae Former Chief Justices In Support Of Petitioner, Carney v. Adams, Oct. 7, 2019, available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-309/130034/20200127153858238_19309%20Carney%20v%20Adams%20Amici%20Curiae%20Professors%20in%20Support%20of%20Petitione
r.pdf (last visited July 12, 2020) (“Delaware’s political balance requirement has produced an excellent
judiciary.”).
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CONCLUSION
The relationship between corporate law and partisan politics has been largely
overlooked in the corporate law literature. Recent developments, such as new movements to
make corporate law more responsive to stakeholders and the recent Supreme Court case of
Carney v. Adams, are giving rise to fundamental questions about this relationship. They call
for a broader framework for understanding the underlying politics of corporate law.
Our article seeks to start the task of filling in this void by offering an original
theoretical and empirical framework for understanding the role of partisan politics in
corporate law. Our empirical analysis suggests that partisan politics could explain
differences among states’ corporate laws, and that partisanship works primarily to benefit
the interests of corporate managers.257 Yet, strikingly, the state in which most large
businesses choose to incorporate—Delaware—adopts a conspicuously nonpartisan approach
to corporate law that insulates it from political partisans. We offer a revised history of
Delaware’s rise by emphasizing that its commitment to nonpartisanship played an early role
in its quest to displace New Jersey as the most popular venue for incorporations.
We claim that Delaware’s nonpartisanship flows from the system of regulatory
competition that gives firms the freedom to choose the corporate law that governs them
through their incorporation decisions. Delaware’s incentives are to attract firm
incorporations to increase its revenue from franchise fees. Nonpartisanship provides a
unique competitive advantage to Delaware in its quest for incorporations. Nonpartisanship
allows Delaware to afford great weight to the interests of nationally diverse and
heterogeneous, but locally weak shareholders, rather than catering to constituents with
strong state political power.
Our analysis has timely policy implications. It suggests that in the aftermath of the
Supreme Court in Carney v. Adams, courts considering the constitutionality of Delaware’s
courts should carefully consider Delaware’s interest in maintaining the bipartisanship of its
judiciary. Although the politics of contemporary lawmaking – whether through legislation
257

We note that further work is necessary to evaluate the implications of our analysis for partisanship at the
federal level, where politically charged debates on corporate law have increasingly played out in recent years.
See Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 969-71 (1984)
(describing Ralph Nader’s proposal to federalize corporate law following 1980s takeover wave by reforming
“corporate boards, such that each board member would represent a special interest, including consumer
protection, employee welfare, environmental protection, and community relations.”); see Accountable
Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018) (Elizabeth Warren’s recent proposal to federalize corporate law,
which would require firms with over $1 billion in revenue to obtain a federal charter, create a “general public
benefit,” and have two fifths of directors elected by employees); Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal
Corporate Law: Lessons from History 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793 (2006) (recommending the implementation
of a federal public companies code in order to adequately police insiders and protect investors). It is not clear
whether partisan debates on corporate law would reflect the same issues on a federal level as on a state level.
See Christopher M. Bruner, Center-Left Politics and Corporate Governance: What Is the “Progressive”
Agenda?, 2 BYU L. REV. (2018) (exploring the diverging approaches of the ideological left at the state and
federal levels on corporate governance issues); but see Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 1077 (2014) (arguing that ideologically coherent national party partisanship animates political activity
at the state level).
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or judicial decision-making – is highly complex,258 the bipartisan balance requirement which
Delaware adopted as early in 1897 appears to be one of the foundational pillars of the current
system and its reputation for expertise and responsiveness. While we cannot predict with
certainty the effect of invalidating the bipartisan balance requirement, we caution that
removing it from the Delaware’s constitution could allow for the slow deterioration of its
nonpartisanship, and might ultimately result in broader changes to the substance of corporate
law-making and adjudication.

258

See e.g., Macey, supra note 70; Roe, supra note 11; Romano, supra note 13;
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Eldar and Rauterberg:

Table 1: Summary Statistics
All
Observations
(3)

Democrat
%
(1)

Republican
%
(2)

All Observations
1980-2007
2008-2017

25.99%
26.68%
24.08%

22.29%
16.40%
38.78%

1,862
1,372
490

Anti-takeover Statutes
Business Combination
Pill Statute
Constituency
Control Acquisition
Fair Price
Extreme

39.00%
36.36%
27.78%
43.75%
38.46%
40.74%
37.50%

11.00%
15.15%
16.67%
9.38%
15.38%
11.11%
0%

100
33
36
32
26
27
8

Anti-Litigation Statutes
Loyalty Waiver
Business Judgment
Universal Demand
Corporate Opportunity Waiver

19.23%
26.09%
37.50%
18.18 %
11.11%

23.08%
34.78%
12.50%
27.27%
11.11%

52
23
8
22
9

Variable

38.64%
36.36%
44
Hybrid Legal Form
Benefit Corporation
34.38%
37.50%
32
Other Hybrid
42.86%
35.71%
14
This table provides summary statistics showing the percentage of state-year observations that
are under Democratic and Republican control out of the total state-year observations when a
given corporate law statute was passed. The sample-period is 1980-2017. All variables are
described in the Sections II.A and II.B.
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Table 2: The Probability of Anti-Takeover Statutes
Democrat
Republican

(1)
0.0333∗∗
(2.11)
-0.0267∗∗
(-2.45)

(2)
0.0400∗∗∗
(3.38)
0.00397
(0.34)

(3)
0.0399∗∗∗
(3.38)
0.00806
(0.69)
0.00679∗∗
(2.34)

No
No
No
0.00829
13.98
0.0000924∗∗∗
1.000
1,760

Yes
Yes
No
0.154
6.364
0.00582∗∗∗
0.994
1,760

Yes
Yes
No
0.156
4.992
0.0127∗∗
0.987
1,760

Largest Local Firm
Lawyers
Unions
Population
Unemployment Rate
Poverty Rate
Avg. Income
Year Indicators
Region Indicators
Year×Region Indicators
R2
WaldDem=Rep
p-valueDem>Rep
p-valueRep>Dem
N

(4)
0.0381∗∗∗
(3.22)
0.00947
(0.82)
0.00285
(0.68)
-0.0135
(-0.61)
0.00247
(1.40)
0.0231
(0.96)
-0.00284
(-0.45)
-0.00154
(-0.75)
-0.000543
(-0.57)
Yes
Yes
No
0.157
4.456
0.0174∗∗
0.983
1,760

(5)
0.0473∗∗∗
(3.32)
0.0167
(1.25)
0.00465
(0.95)
-0.0110
(-0.45)
0.00211
(1.12)
0.0182
(0.69)
-0.00665
(-1.05)
-0.000583
(-0.25)
-0.000168
(-0.13)
No
No
Yes
0.283
4.113
0.0213∗∗
0.979
1,760

This table shows the results of a random effects model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a state passed
an anti-takeover statute in a given year. All variables are described in the Sections II.A and II.B. WaldDem=Rep is
the Wald Statistic that tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient on Democrat is equal to the coefficient on
Republican. p-valueDem>Rep (p-valueRep>Dem) is the p-value of the Wald statistic that tests the null hypothesis that
the coefficient on Democrat (Republican) is larger than the coefficient on Democrat (Republican). Standard
errors are robust and clustered at the state level. t statistics are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p <
0.01
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Eldar and Rauterberg:

Table 3: The Probability of Anti-Litigation Statutes
Democrat
Republican

(1)
-0.00956
(-1.05)
-0.0103
(-0.77)

(2)
-0.00393
(-0.39)
0.0118
(0.85)

(3)
-0.00399
(-0.40)
0.0123
(0.88)
0.00102
(0.31)

No
No
No
0.000470
0.00305
0.478
0.522
1,470

Yes
Yes
No
0.0401
1.281
0.871
0.129
1,470

Yes
Yes
No
0.0402
1.403
0.882
0.118
1,470

Largest Local Firm
Lawyers
Unions
Population
Unemployment Rate
Poverty Rate
Avg. Income
Year Indicators
Region Indicators
Year×Region Indicators
R2
WaldDem=Rep
p-valueDem>Rep
p-valueRep>Dem
N

(4)
-0.00557
(-0.58)
0.0101
(0.66)
0.00226
(0.46)
-0.0451∗
(-1.79)
0.000682
(0.38)
0.0479∗
(1.78)
-0.00162
(-0.39)
-0.000619
(-0.26)
0.000583
(0.59)
Yes
Yes
No
0.0426
1.067
0.849
0.151
1,470

(5)
-0.00150
(-0.12)
0.0159
(0.99)
0.00127
(0.30)
-0.0352
(-1.22)
0.000722
(0.38)
0.0395
(1.30)
-0.00430
(-0.82)
-0.000482
(-0.19)
-0.0000987
(-0.11)
No
No
Yes
0.216
1.247
0.868
0.132
1,470

This table shows the results of a random effects model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a state
passed an anti-litigation statute in a given year. All variables are described in the Sections II.A and II.B.
W aldDem=Rep is the Wald Statistic that tests the null hypothesis that coefficient on Democrat is equal to
the coefficient on Republican. p-valueDem>Rep (p- valueRep>Dem) is the p-value of the Wald statistic that
tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient on Democrat (Republican) is larger than the coefficient on
Democrat (Republican). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. t statistics in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: The Probability of Hybrid Legal Form Statutes
Democrat
Republican

(1)
0.0836∗∗
(2.25)
0.0238
(0.94)

(2)
0.0561
(1.40)
-0.00802
(-0.40)

(3)
0.0551
(1.39)
-0.00580
(-0.29)
0.00503
(0.96)

No
No
No
0.0127
3.952
0.0234∗∗∗
0.977
490

Yes
Yes
No
0.108
2.640
0.0521∗
0.948
490

Yes
Yes
No
0.109
2.412
0.0602∗
0.940
490

Largest Local Firm
Lawyers
Unions
Population
Unemployment Rate
Poverty Rate
Avg. Income
Year Indicators
Region Indicators
Year×Region Indicators
R2
WaldDem=Rep
p-valueDem>Rep
p-valueRep>Dem
N

(4)
0.0575
(1.43)
-0.00531
(-0.22)
-0.00752
(-0.86)
0.0990∗∗
(2.13)
-0.00408
(-1.40)
-0.0839∗
(-1.66)
0.00723
(0.83)
-0.00637
(-1.09)
-0.00265
(-1.40)
Yes
Yes
No
0.116
2.495
0.0571∗
0.943
490

(5)
0.0586
(1.43)
-0.0151
(-0.54)
-0.00691
(-0.76)
0.0725
(1.58)
-0.00367
(-1.13)
-0.0563
(-1.12)
0.00397
(0.46)
-0.00408
(-0.68)
-0.00109
(-0.56)
No
No
Yes
0.276
3.164
0.0376∗∗
0.962
490

This table shows the results of a random effects model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
state passed a hybrid legal form statute in a given year. All variables are described in the Sections II.A
and II.B. WaldDem=Rep is the Wald Statistic that tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient on
Democrat is equal to the coefficient on Republican. p- valueDem>Rep (p-valueRep>Dem) is the p-value of
the Wald statistic that tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient on Democrat (Republican) is larger
than the coefficient on Democrat (Republican). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state
level. t statistics are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: The Probability of Individual Corporate Law Statutes
Anti-takeover Statutes
Pill Statute

Democrat
Republican
Largest Local Firm
Year Indicators
Region Indicators
R2
Wald Dem=Rep
p-valueDem>Rep
p-valueRep>Dem
N

(1)
0.0104
(0.65)
0.0239
(1.12)
0.0122∗∗∗
(2.68)
Yes
Yes
0.142
0.303
0.709
0.291
900

Business
Combination
(2)
0.0296
(1.59)
0.00887
(0.45)
0.0174∗∗∗
(2.67)
Yes
Yes
0.147
0.990
0.160
0.840
818

Fair Price
(3)
0.0222
(1.45)
0.0124
(1.05)
0.00755∗
(1.68)
Yes
Yes
0.117
0.409
0.261
0.739
951

Control
Constituency
Acquisition
(5)
(4)
0.0177
0.0472∗∗∗
(1.39)
(2.66)
0.0177
-0.0126
(1.31)
(-0.75)
0.00641∗
0.00336
(0.76)
(1.75)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.117
0.127
0.00000918
7.513
0.00306∗∗∗
0.499
0.501
0.997
998
885

Anti-Litigation Statutes
Extreme

Loyalty

(6)
0.00137
(0.31)
-0.00431
(-1.21)
0.00175
(1.15)
Yes
Yes
0.0538
2.400
0.0607∗
0.939
1,620

(7)
0.0147
(1.36)
0.0435∗∗∗
(2.73)
-0.000182
(-0.05)
Yes
Yes
0.0586
3.564
0.970
0.0295∗∗
1,003

Business
Judgement
(8)
0.00399
(1.00)
0.000434
(0.10)
0.00109
(0.80)
Yes
Yes
0.0456
0.538
0.232
0.768
1,564

Universal
Demand
(10)
0.000513
(0.06)
0.0196
(1.43)
-0.000820
(-0.27)
Yes
Yes
0.0539
1.860
0.914
0.0863∗
1,107

Hybrid Legal Forms
COW
(9)
-0.0140
(-1.56)
-0.0159
(-1.48)
0.00390
(1.31)
Yes
Yes
0.0304
0.0422
0.419
0.581
788

Benefit
Corporation
(11)
0.0748∗
(1.71)
-0.0498
(-1.46)
0.00898
(0.94)
Yes
Yes
0.139
8.556
0.00172∗∗∗
0.998
367

Other
Hybrids
(12)
0.00892
(0.41)
-0.00124
(-0.10)
0.00121
(0.29)
Yes
Yes
0.109
0.177
0.337
0.663
490

This table shows the results of a random effects model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a state passed the relevant corporate law statute in a given year.
All variables are described in the Sections II.A and II.B. WaldDem=Rep is the Wald Statistic that tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient on Democrat is equal to
the coefficient on Republican. p-valueDem>Rep (p-valueRep>Dem) is the p-value of the Wald statistic that tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient on Democrat
(Republican) is larger than the coefficient on Democrat (Republican). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. t statistics are in parentheses. ∗ p <
0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p <0.01
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